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NEWSDAY

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AUG 1 7 1972

Sub Accusation Called Baseless

Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said yesterday he was persuaded that there was "no basis for charges that the Russians lied" to President Nixon during negotiations on the interim U.S.-Soviet missile freeze.

Nevertheless, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) said he was sticking by his charge that the Soviets lied by saying they had 48 missile-firing submarines under construction rather than 41 to 43.

Fulbright told newsmen it was clear, from the briefing the Central Intelligence Agency gave his committee and from an administration disclosure of May 26, that the two countries have different interpretations of what constitutes a submarine under construction.

Meanwhile, the House postponed its expected approval of the five-year agreement until tonight.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

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S - 867,810

AUG 17 1972

Washington Dateline

Did Soviets 'Lie' to Nixon? Fulbright Plans Probe

Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.) has ordered an inquiry into Sen. Henry M. Jackson's allegation that the Russians "lied to President Nixon" in the final SALT negotiations in Moscow.

Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, directed the committee staff to question the Central Intelligence Agency about the report. And he asked Mr. Nixon for an explanation or denial.

Jackson (D., Wash.) injected the allegation into the debate over the U. S.-Soviet interim agreement on offensive weapons and his amendment urging the United States to seek "equality" with the Soviet Union in any future permanent agreement.

Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield (Mont.) said he did not think the President was bamboozled or taken in at Moscow. Mansfield said he was certain Mr. Nixon and his principal advisers—Henry A. Kissinger and Gerard Smith—"were aware of what they were doing."



Sen. Fulbright

SALT Pact Hits New Hill Snag

By Jack Fuller

Washington Post Staff Writer

Chances dimmed yesterday for President Nixon to have a package of arms limitation agreements ratified by Congress to take to the Republican convention next week.

The House unexpectedly delayed its scheduled debate on the U.S.-Russian offensive weapons pact, while Senate disagreement over when and how to stop debate on amendments to the agreement continued to prevent any vote on the matter.

Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met behind closed doors to question government intelligence experts about a charge that the Russians had lied to the United States during the negotiations that led to the agreement.

Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) said after a CIA briefing there is "no basis for charges that the Russians lied."

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), whose amendment to the agreement has precipitated the extended debate, said Tuesday that he had "intelligence" information that the Russians have only 42 Y-class submarines deployed or under construction, though they had claimed to have 48.

Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) urged Jackson to back up his charge and urged the Nixon administration to present its side of the story.

"I don't believe the President was bamboozled or taken in by the Russians," Mansfield said.

Administration officials before the agreement was signed noted publicly the discrepancy between the Russian and U.S. estimates of Soviet submarine strength, and attributed it to a disagreement about the definition of "under construction."

The House ran behind on its schedule yesterday and postponed debate on the arms agreement. Today the House is scheduled to take up a controversial measure involving the busing of schoolchildren, and it may not reach the arms agreement until Friday.

No progress was reported by Senate leaders on reaching an agreement to end debate, and Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) said there appeared to be a "movement to prevent the Senate from voting."

Jackson's amendment would urge the President to seek "equality" of offensive weapons between the U.S. and Soviet Union in the second round of arms talks.

STATOTHR

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for the dikes. It doesn't take a Philadelphia lawyer to label this policy for what it is—a policy of deliberately bombing dikes. If the direct result of bombing a target beside a dike is that bombs will inevitably hit the dike, then the dike is being bombed as deliberately as if the dike itself were the target.

And so I urge the administration to recognize the drastic implication of its policy, and to take immediate action to prevent any destruction of the dikes of North Vietnam. Surely, in the name of decency, the military priorities of the administration and its policy of massive bombing must yield to the simple human fact that countless innocent lives are being jeopardized when the dikes are bombed. Surely, in its unseemly zeal to bomb the North into a settlement of the war before election day, the administration can at least pull back from the awful brink of destruction and spare the dikes. Surely, America can forgo the destruction of a military target if it means the safety of a dike.

One more point should be made. The issue of the bombing of the dikes has become a cause of legitimate and substantial concern throughout the world. The allegations about the dikes are clearly raising new and increasingly serious doubts in the international community about America's role in Vietnam. Perhaps the most ominous aspect of the controversy, apart from the enormous question of the validity of the allegations being made, is the extremely hostile, defensive and increasingly isolated posture the President has adopted in seeking to rebut the charges.

The latest incident was the President's news conference last week, in which he labeled the Secretary General of the United Nations as naive and a dupe of Hanoi for daring to raise the question of the dikes. Mr. Waldheim is a distinguished and respected diplomat who has the confidence of all the member nations of the United Nations. I deeply regret the desperate ad hominem attack he has now suffered at the hands of the administration for speaking out of conscience on what has already become one of the great moral issues of the war. The proper stance of the administration on the issue is to deal on the merits with the questions about the dikes, not to attack those who raise the issue.

Incidents like this demonstrate why the Senate resolution introduced today comes at such an important time. The Senate has its own responsibility to help resolve the issue of the dikes. It is my hope that the serious questions now outstanding about our policy will be answered at once, so that the conscience of America can be cleared, at least on this new and ominous aspect of the war. What is at stake here is not simply the outcome of the war, but the judgment of history on the actions of the United States against a tiny Asian nation.

Mr. PROXIMIRE. Mr. President, I am delighted to be a cosponsor of the resolution putting the Senate firmly on record in opposition to the bombing of the dikes in North Vietnam.

It is almost impossible to determine with any accuracy what damage our

planes are causing the dikes. On the one hand we have the sort of denial I received from the Defense Department on July 19 indicating that, and I quote:

The remote possibility exists that in our bombing of . . . military targets minor damage may have occurred to dikes or small irrigation dams.

On the other hand we have accusations by the North Vietnamese that we are deliberately bombing a great number of dikes.

The truth undoubtedly lies somewhere in between.

I am quite sure that we are not engaged in a systematic attempt to destroy the dikes in the North. As this resolution makes clear, the President stated on June 29 that this was against American policy.

However, at a time when a ranking officer in South Vietnam, General Lavelle, can conduct unauthorized bombing raids and receive no more than a gentle slap on the wrist, it is entirely possible, even probable, that individuals charged with flying sorties might find it in accordance with their concept of national policy to take a few runs at the dikes.

This is why I believe today's resolution is so important. It not only makes it clear to our friends around the world who are understandable upset by the recent charges that the Senate does not condone attacks on North Vietnam's dike system. It also serves to discourage American airmen from taking steps that they may mistakenly feel are in our national interest, despite our official posture.

I am hopeful that the Senate can act quickly to implement this resolution.

I ask unanimous consent that my letter to Secretary of Defense Laird on this issue as well as the Defense Department's response be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JUNE 27, 1972.

The Honorable MELVIN LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The New York Times for June 26, 1972 carries a piece by Anthony Lewis raising the question of whether or not the United States is now bombing the dikes in North Vietnam.

Mr. Lewis cites the President's statement in April saying that it was something we wanted to avoid and that it was not needed.

He also cites a number of specific public statements, two of them by non-Vietnam sources asserting that the dikes have been bombed. One charged that "one of the dikes was completely cut" and another asserted that "Without doubt there is now systematic bombing of the dikes."

Mr. Lewis states that no one should doubt what bombing the dikes might mean. "It would bring into play, justifiably for once, that much abused word genocide."

I am writing to you to ask for a specific straightforward, unhedged, and unqualified statement by you as to the facts.

Has the U.S. bombed any of the dikes?

Is the U.S. systematically bombing the dikes?

If we are not bombing the dikes, would you cite the specific detailed orders which were given not to bomb them?

If we are bombing the dikes would you cite the specific authority under which you or the President specifically authorized the bombing.

We need an explicit statement of the facts and our policy now.

I would appreciate an immediate reply. If we are bombing, Congress and the U.S. public need to know it. If we are not, that should be made public in order to forestall charges which have no basis in fact.

I am enclosing Mr. Lewis' article.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

WILLIAM PROXIMIRE,
U.S. Senator.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., July 19, 1972.

Hon. WILLIAM PROXIMIRE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PROXIMIRE: Secretary Laird has asked me to reply to your letter of June 27, 1972, concerning the alleged bombing of the dikes in North Vietnam by the United States.

The United States has exercised great restraint in our current bombing of North Vietnam. The US is not targeting dikes or dams in North Vietnam. Since some military targets, such as bridges and anti-aircraft artillery and missile sites are sometimes near dikes or dams, the remote possibility exists that in our bombing of these military targets minor damage may have occurred to dikes or small irrigation dams. Some enemy anti-aircraft sites have been placed on or near dikes and our pilots have the authority, and the inherent right of self-protection, to attack such sites in self-defense. Furthermore, there is an obvious possibility of damage to dikes or irrigation dams from North Vietnamese SAMs, downed MIGs or anti-aircraft shells falling back to earth.

It is quite clear that the North Vietnamese are conducting a worldwide propaganda campaign falsely alleging that the United States is systematically bombing their dike system. No doubt the United States will be blamed by North Vietnam for any and all damages to the dike system over the next few months.

In fact, floods occurred last year in North Vietnam in the absence of bombing partially because of the generally poor state of maintenance of the water conservancy system. Furthermore, the following warning on the neglected state of the system appeared in the official North Vietnamese newspaper, *Hanoi Moi*, on July 29, 1972:

"In some places the repair of the dike portions that were damaged by torrential rains in 1971 has not yet met technical requirements. A number of thin and weakened dikes which are probably full of termite colonies and holes have not yet been detected for repair. Therefore, cadres and people in the capital must absolutely not be subjective: Let each individual, locality and unit actively participate in the present dike-strengthening movement; especially in firming and solidifying the important portion of dikes. There is not much time before the torrential rain season."

These facts should set the record straight on our actual bombing policies and North Vietnamese allegations.

Sincerely,

DENNIS J. DOOLIN.

SENATE RESOLUTION 343—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION RELATING TO BRIEFINGS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TO MEMBERS OF THE SENATE

(Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. COOPER, and Mr. BOOGS) submitted the following resolution:

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U.S. ISSUES REPORT TO REBUT CHARGES ON DIKE BOMBINGS

Intelligence Document Says
Hits Were Unintentional
and Damage Was Minor

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 28—The Administration today released a Government intelligence report finding that American bombing had damaged North Vietnam's dike system at 12 points. But the report concluded that the hits were unintentional, their impact was minor "and no major dike has been breached."

The eight-page report, put together largely by the Central Intelligence Agency, was given

Text of State Department's
report is on Page 2.

newsmen by the State Department to buttress the Administration's contention that North Vietnam was falsely charging the United States with bombing the dikes systematically and deliberately.

"Photographic evidence shows conclusively that there has been no intentional bombing of the dikes," the report said. The photographs were taken on July 10 and 11, a State Department official said. Later photos were not available, the official said, because reconnaissance flights by the United States Air Force were hampered by cloud conditions over the Red River Delta area in which the extensive 2,700-mile network of dikes and dams is centered.

In the dispute between President Nixon and Secretary General Waldheim over bombing of dikes, the Secretary General called in George Bush, the United States delegate. Their conversation, while not described publicly, dealt with Mr. Nixon's charge that Mr. Waldheim had been "taken in" by Hanoi's assertions. And in South Dakota,

Senator George McGovern asserted that Mr. Nixon had "stooped beneath the dignity of his office" in his news-conference comments on bombing. Pages 2 and 10.]

The intelligence report made public today declared "Photographic evidence shows conclusively that there has been no intentional bombing of the dikes." The pictures on which the findings were based were taken on July 10 and 11, a State Department official said.

Later photos were not available, the official said, because

reconnaissance flights by the United States Air Force were hampered by cloud conditions over the Red River Delta area, in which the extensive, 2,700-mile network of dikes and dams is centered.

The report also said that all the dike damage occurred within close range of "specific targets of military value."

"Of the 12 locations where damage has occurred, 10 are close to identified individual targets such as petroleum storage facilities, and the other two are adjacent to road and river transport lines," the report said.

It said that because a large number of the dikes serve as the bases for roadways, "the maze they create throughout the delta makes it almost inevitable that air attacks directed against transportation targets cause scattered damage to dikes."

The report said that the bomb craters identified by photographic reconnaissance at the 12 locations "can be repaired easily with a minimum of labor and equipment—a crew of less than 50 men with wheelbarrows and hand tools could repair in a day the largest crater observed."

"Repairs to all the dikes could be completed within a week," it said.

Although the report was based on photographer reconnaissance, the State Department refused to show newsmen any of the photographic evidence. A department official said that it was decided today not to issue the photograph because it was felt by the Administration that this would only provoke North Vietnam to issue its own photographs in rebuttal, some of which might be "fabricated."

This report, including the photographs, prepared earlier and presented on Monday to Kurt Waldheim, secretary general of the United Nations, by George Bush, the United States delegate. Mr. Waldheim had said he had unofficial information that the United States was bombing the dikes.

Yesterday, at his news conference, President Nixon forcefully denied Hanoi's charges about a systematic bombing campaign against the dikes and said that Mr. Waldheim and other well-intentioned and naive people" had been "taken in" by Hanoi's propaganda.

Mr. Nixon conceded, as have other spokesmen, that there had been some damage to the dikes by accidental hits. Today North Vietnam's radio repeated that "Nixon has intentionally attacked the dike network in North Vietnam in line with all his wicked and barbarous plans."

Senator J. W. Fulbright, chair-

man of the Foreign Relations Committee, was briefed along with other Senators by the C. I. A. a few days ago. He said today that he had no quarrel with the conclusion of the report. He said that the photo evidence he was shown seemed to support the view that the dike damage was near military targets.

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CHICAGO, ILL.

NEWS

E - 434,849

JUN 22 1972

Suspicion mounts

On Laird's arms plea

By William McGaughy
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Suspicion is growing here that Defense Sec. Melvin R. Laird is speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he links the Moscow arms limitation agreements and big spending on new nuclear weapons systems.

Whether Laird also is speaking for President Nixon is something that White House correspondents have failed to pin down although they have tried for three days in a row to get the answer out of Ronald Ziegler, White House press secretary.

When Laird appears on Capitol Hill to repeat what he originally stated June 6 — that he would recommend against adoption of the Moscow agreements if Congress failed to support administration requests for big increases in spending on a new missile submarine and a new manned bomber — he always is accompanied by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer,

the chairman, has never stated publicly that he, too, would recommend against adoption of the agreements under those circumstances. But he has backed up Laird's argument that the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber are vital to national security.

THE CHIEFS, as President Nixon told Congress, "unanimously" approved the arms limitation agreements. But their price for this, it is believed, is administration pressure on Congress to win approval of the new weapons funding.

When Ziegler was pressed on the question of whether Laird was speaking for the President, he said this was a hypothetical question. This was so, he said, because the President expects Congress to approve the Moscow agreements and to approve the defense budget as well.

He then observed that Presidential assistant Henry Kissinger had stated at the briefing for key congressmen that there was no link between the

agreements and the new weapons projects, that each stood on its own merits.

Finally, he said Laird was speaking as defense secretary. But he never did say whether he also was speaking for the President.

SOME OF the sharpest criticism Laird has encountered in his 3½ years as defense secretary was voiced Wednesday when he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), committee chairman, accused Laird of using "scare tactics" and "misinformation" to try to win congressional approval of the stepped up spending on weapons.

Laird had done the same thing in 1969, Fulbright charged, when he "scared" Congress into appropriating money for an anti-ballistic missile system. Laird's argument then, that this was necessary to counter a Russian first-strike threat, was discounted by the Central Intelligence Agency, Fulbright asserted. Laird denied this.

Fulbright observed the committee had an executive session Tuesday with CIA Director Richard Helms and that the intelligence information he supplied did not jibe with that provided by Laird.

Activities in Congress

TODAY

Senate

Meets at 9 a.m.

Committees:
Armed Services—10 a.m. Open: Military Implications of SALT agreements. Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird; chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Moore; Paul Nitze, Department of Defense, 1114 New Bldg.

Banking—10 a.m. Open: S3073, Improve techniques in federally assisted housing and S3654, Davis-Bacon provision applicable to federally assisted housing. 5302 New Bldg.

Labor and Public Welfare Subcomte—9:30 a.m. Open: Role of land grant colleges. Earl Butz, Secretary of Agriculture; Tony Dechant, National Farmers Union, 1202 New Bldg.

Judiciary Subcomte—9:30 a.m. Open: Financing institutions and mortgage companies. G. R. Orsi, Century Federal Savings and Loan, N.Y.; Frank Cheeseman, City and County Savings, N.Y.; John Haskell, Oneida Savings Bank, N.Y.; Warren Light, United Institutional Servicing Corp., N.Y. 2223 New Bldg.

Public Works Subcomte—10 a.m. Open: Omnibus river and harbor flood control legislation. Army wifns. 4200 New Bldg.

Rules Subcomte—10 a.m. Open: S3231, senatorial travel expenses. 391 Old Bldg.

D.C. Subcomte—9:30 a.m. Open: S2693, create District of Columbia Youth Commission. Bernard Nordlinger, D.C. Bar Assoc., Frederick Vinson, immediate past pres.; Frederick Ballard, juvenile delinquency committee; Charles Bryant, Health and Welfare Council; Father McCarthy, Assumption Church. 6226 New Bldg.

Commerce—10 a.m. Exec.: Comte business. 5112 New Bldg.

Foreign Relations—10 a.m. Exec.: Director Helms on SALT agreements. S116 Cap.

Interior Subcomte—10 a.m. Exec.: Surface mining bills. 3112 New Bldg.

Judiciary—10:30 a.m. Exec.: Calendar bus. 2300 New Bldg.

Conferees—11 a.m. HUO, space, science

and veterans appropriations bill. S228 Cap.

Jackson Unhappy With Arms Briefing

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) yesterday promised "tough questions" for the Nixon administration at congressional hearings next week on the strategic arms limitation agreements with Moscow.

Voicing dissatisfaction with the White House briefings for key members of Congress on Thursday, Jackson said he plans to play the role of prosecuting attorney when the agreements come up before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The senator told the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists that he felt the Soviet Union would be "more intransigent" and "difficult to handle" as a result of the agreements. He said they give Moscow the edge "in crucial categories of strategic offensive systems."

Jackson reiterated fears that election-year pressures led President Nixon to make damaging concessions.

A high-ranking member of the Armed Services Committee and dark-horse presidential hopeful, Jackson stopped short of saying he would vote against the agreements. He said he hoped he could support them.

But first, he said, he will try to find out "what concessions were made in Moscow in the

last few hours, the nature of them and the extent of them."

Jackson said he is especially concerned over the lack of a specific limitation on the number of land-based missiles and the lack of any clear definition of what a "heavy missile" is.

He said he suspects that the Soviet Union agreed to a limitation on submarines because their construction could be easily monitored.

He felt Moscow balked at a definite limit on land-based missiles because these can be scattered over millions of square miles in areas that are covered by clouds 80 per cent of time."

White House national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger had told Jackson and his congressional colleagues Thursday that if intelligence showed the Soviets significantly exceeded the 1,618 missiles they are believed to have, then "the whole premise of the agreement will be in question," even without a specific limit. Jackson maintained yesterday, in effect, that American intelligence may find its surveillance efforts fruitless.

Hearings on the agreements will begin Monday before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Secretary of State William P. Rogers as the leadoff witness. Gerard C. Smith, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, also will testify. On Wednesday Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will testify. Both hearings will be public. The Foreign Relations Committee said it also hopes to hear Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms later in closed session.

The Armed Services Committee will meet Tuesday with Laird to hear about the impact of the agreements on the U. S. defense posture. The committee is marking up the fiscal 1973.

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13 MAY 1972

Mercenary use in Laos shows evils of secrecy

Washington.

Secrecy leads to self-deception. If you want proof of that overlooked political axiom, then look at the way we have gotten involved with a secret mercenary army in Laos.

It all started off not so innocently a decade ago when the Central Intelligence Agency recruited, directed and supported an army of Meo tribesmen to keep Laos from going Communist. It was like having a Gurkha army of our own, only no one knew we had it and thus nobody cared that we were getting ever more involved in a war in Laos.

It was all going along splendidly until the CIA sent General Vang Pao and his army off on an ill-fated offensive last spring. The Meo "irregulars" got chewed up; they had about 10 per cent casualties. That might not have been too bad except there were no more tribesmen to recruit in Laos. So the CIA started recruiting mercenaries in Thailand, only it called them "volunteers." Now the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has discovered that we have a \$100 million annual commitment to finance an army of 10,000 Thai "volunteers" fighting in Laos.

The Thai like it because they are getting good pay as well as extra military assistance from the United States. Presumably the Lao like it because the Meo and Thai can do the fighting. But what about the Congress and the poor American taxpayer who never knew they were running up a \$100 million annual bill in Laos? And what does it say about the present moral character of a nation that 200

years ago won its independence fighting Hessian mercenaries?

Put aside all the moral, geopolitical and financial considerations. It's also a disturbing ease of the evils of secrecy in our government and Congress. Secrecy provides a way to subvert the constitutional checks and balances of the war powers.

Oh sure, the CIA informed a few members of the Appropriations Committee. But then it intimidated them by explaining it was so hush-hush they couldn't talk about it to the rest of Congress. After that the privileged few didn't even bother to raise questions—that was until Senator Stuart Symington and his Foreign Relations subcommittee came along and started poking around in the secret war in Laos. Even now the State Department and CIA won't fess up to what they are doing with the Thai mercenaries. The reason is that Congress last year passed a law prohibiting the use of defense funds to help third-country forces fight in support of the Laotian or Cambodian governments. If all the facts were made public, it would be evident that the executive branch was violating the law.

It's easy enough to blame the executive branch for its secrecy. Everybody knows—including President Nixon, who issued a new executive order on classification recently—that the government business is weighted down with excessive secrecy. There's probably no cure unless bureaucrats are punished for over-classification, and nobody is about to do that. But much of the blame must be placed on Congress for the

way it has tolerated secrecy even within its own ranks.

For all its criticism of the executive branch, Congress really likes secrecy. At least those in power do because secrecy means power. "If you only knew what I know" makes a senator very important in his own eyes and in the eyes of his colleagues. It also is a very good argument to silence any upstart who dares question the wisdom of the Appropriations Committee or the Armed Services Committee.

If you want a bewildering example, take the case of Senator Symington. One day he is issuing a statement deplored the executive branch's secrecy on the Thai mercenaries. The next day he is on the Senate floor questioning whether secrets should be given to members of Congress except those on the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Atomic Energy committees. Senator Symington, it should be pointed out, is the only member of all three committees.

Secrecy is also a convenient way for Congress to avoid responsibility it really doesn't like. "Only the President has access to all the secret information and he must know what is right." That's a common refrain around Capitol Hill these days when the President is getting us deeper into the Vietnam war. It's also an easy way to hide behind the President and duck responsibility.

The whole security system obviously is not going to come tumbling down. Nor should it. But once Congress starts questioning it, maybe it will begin to realize that Senator Mike Gravel has a point when he argues that Congress also can determine what information should be made public. Right now it's reached the point of absurdity; the Senate sends its debates in secret session down to the executive branch to be declassified.

Congress ought to understand that it need not be such a willing, acquiescent partner in a secrecy system that leads not only to deception but to the amnesia of Congress.

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13 JUN 1972

The Day's Activities in Congress

TODAY

Senate

Meets at 10:30 a.m. on foreign aid bill.

Committees:

Commerce Subcomte.—10 a.m. Open. Reduced or discounted air fares for elderly, handicapped, or certain family members of airline employees. Sen. Percy; Robert Binder, DOT; Stuart Tipton, Air Transport Assn. 5110 New Bldg.

Commerce—10 a.m. Open. S-3474, funds for National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Administration Safety Act of 1966. Douglas Toms, National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.; Harris Diflow, and Carl Nash, Public Interest Research Group. 1202 New Bldg.

Commerce—10 a.m. Open. Nominations of Michael A. Gammino Jr., Joseph D. Hughes, Gloria Anderson, Theodore Braun, and Neal Blackwell Freeman as directors of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting; and of Frank Fitzsimmons as a director of the Communications Satellite Corp. 1318 New Bldg.

Judiciary Subcomte.—10 a.m. Open. S-3538 and 3539, treatment of barbituates in controlled substances schedules. Industry wtns. 2278 New Bldg.

Judiciary Subcomte.—10 a.m. Open. Effectiveness of rehabilitation programs of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. James Hoffa, representing the Teamsters Union; F. Lee Bailey; Ray Prounier, Calif. Dept. of Corrections; Two inmates from a correctional program "Break Through." 318 Old Bldg.

Labor Subcomte.—10 a.m. Exec. S-3327, health maintenance organizations. 4232 New Bldg.

Joint Economic—10 a.m. Open. Economic development in People's Republic of China. Sen. Mansfield and Scott; Prof. Ta-Chung Liu, chairman, dept. of economics, Cornell University; Prof. Benjamin Schwartz, East Asian Research Center, Harvard Univ. S-407 Cap.

Appropriations—2 p.m. Exec. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. S-126 Cap. Armed Services—10 a.m. Exec. Briefing on Southeast Asia. Brig. Gen. Pauly. 212 Old Bldg.

Finance—10 a.m. Exec. HR 1. 2219 New Bldg.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy—2 p.m. Exec. Briefing by CIA. H-403 Cap. Conferees—1:30 p.m. S-1893. Restore Golden Eagle program to provide for three categories of annual recreation permits. EF-100 Cap.

Conferees—10 a.m. HR 12931, Rural Development Act. S-207 Cap.

Republican Policy—12:30 p.m. S-207 Cap.

Democratic Policy—12:30 p.m. S-221 Cap.

Government Operations Subcomte.—10 a.m. Exec. S-1177, Consumer Protection Act. 3302 New Bldg.

Conferees—10 a.m. S-2270, Water Pollution Control Act. S-145 Cap.

Conferees—3:30 p.m. HR 14734, USIA authorization. S-116 Cap.

House

Meets at noon on Interior appropriation.

Committees:

Armed Services—10 a.m. Exec. HR 12604, military procurement auth. John Foster Jr., dir., Defense Research and Eng. and Robt. Moot, asst. defense sec. 2118 Rayburn Office Bldg.

Banking—10:30 a.m. Open. Housing legis. HUD Sec. Romney. 2128 ROB.

Crime in U.S.—10 a.m. Open. Organized crime in sports. Unnamed witness will discuss the drugging of horses at sixteen race tracks. 345 Cannon Office Bldg.

Foreign Affairs—10 a.m. Exec. Mark up comte. Print of a joint resolution concerning termination of hostilities in Indochina. 2172 ROB.

Foreign Affairs—2 p.m. Open. Infl. org. and movements subcomte. Sanctions as an instrumentality of the U.N.—Rhodesia as a case study. Amb. Wm. Schaufele, senior adviser to the permanent rep. to the U.N., and Bruce Oudes, journalist. 2155 ROB.

Commerce—10 a.m. Open. Public health and environ. Subcomte. HR 12563, Medical Emergency Trans. and Service Act, and HR 12787, Emergency Medical Services Act. Dept. wtns. 2325 ROB.

Commerce—10 a.m. Exec. transportation and aeronautics subcomte. pending legis. 2118 ROB.

Commerce—10 a.m. Exec. Commerce and finance subcomte. Staff rec. on the securities industry study. 2322 ROB.

Judiciary—10:30 a.m. Exec. Pending legis. 2141 ROB.

Merchant Marine—10 a.m. Open. Coast Guard subcomte. HR 8140. Ports and Waterways Safety Act. Pub. wtns. 1334 Longworth Office Bldg.

Interior—9:45 a.m. Open. HR 7211, Land use policy legis. 1324 ROB.

Post Office—9:30 a.m. Exec. Retirement, insurance and health benefits subcomte. Mark-up pending legis. 210 COB.

Post Office—10 a.m. Open. Empl. benefits subcomte. Proposals of CSC lab evaluation and pay review task force. Robt. Well, Assn. of Hearing Examiners, HEW, and pub. wtns. 321 COB.

Public Works—10:30 a.m. Exec. Public bldgs. and grounds subcomte. Pending bldgs. prospectuses and S-851, Richard B. Russell, fed. bldg. (11 a.m.)—HR 14475, Capitol Power Plant improvements. 2167 ROB.

Science—10 a.m. Open. Subcomte. On int'l. cooperation in science and space. U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative agreements. McGeorge Bundy, pres., Ford Foundation, and Herman Pollack, State Dept. 2318 ROB.

Small Business—9:30 a.m. Open. Subcomte on special small business problems. Anticompetitive impact of oil company ownership of petroleum products pipelines. Hoyt Haddock, exec. dir., AFL-CIO maritime comte.; D.C. and pub. wtns. 2359 ROB.

Small Business—10 a.m. Open. Govt. procurement subcomte. role of small business in foreign trade and investment. Dept. wtns. 2237 ROB.

Veterans' Affairs—9:45 a.m. Exec. S-3343, increase spec. housing allowance, and HR 114 10, increase rates of service-connected disability compensation. 334 COB.

Ways and Means—10 a.m. Exec. pending legis. comte rm. LOB.

Government Operations—10 a.m. Open. Foreign oper. and govt. info. subcomte. Pub. wtns. 2154 ROB.

YESTERDAY

Senate

Convened at 11 a.m.

Approved, 74-0, treaties on International Plant Protection Convention, Acts of Terrorism, and Swan Islands.

Approved by voice vote conference report on HR 9580, D.C. truck fees.

Confirmed Thomas Patrick Melady as ambassador to Uganda.

Began debate on S 3390, foreign military aid authorization.

Adjourned at 4:26 p.m.

House

Convened at noon.

Approved, 320-0, HR 10792, SBA loan ceiling.

Approved, 322-1, HR 12846, armed forces drug treatment.

Adjourned at 5:09 p.m.

President's Schedule

United Press International

President Nixon's appointments today: 8 a.m. — Republican congressional leaders.

~~Columnists~~*Clayton Fritchey*

Accurate Reports by CIA Go Unheeded



STATOTHR

WASHINGTON—if we didn't know better, there would be reason to suspect the Central Intelligence Agency of being in back of the celebrated "leaks" that have stood Washington on its head in recent times, for each of the revelations has enhanced the reputation and standing of the CIA.

In that respect, the latest exposé revolving around the disclosure of the so-called "Kissinger Papers," is no different from the famed "Pentagon Papers" of last year or the more recent "Anderson Papers." No matter how you slice these papers, the CIA comes out looking realistic and dependable, at least comparatively so.

Nixon Had Good Advice

It is possible to see now [thru the just-revealed Kissinger Papers] that President Nixon, like President Johnson, had good advice, much of it supplied by the CIA, as well as bad advice, and that both chief executives chose to listen to what they wanted to hear, which is why the war is still going on.

Soon after taking office in 1969, Nixon, thru his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, initiated a review of the Viet Nam conflict. The results of the study, leaked to the press and Congress last week, showed the CIA was bearish on the war. On bombing, for example, it said:

"The air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Viet Nam. Nor did it significantly erode North Viet Nam's military defense capabilities or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war."

That was nearly four years ago, and still looks like sound advice today. Nixon, however, didn't want to believe it then and apparently can't reconcile himself to it even now. The U. S. Air Force is presently dropping more bombs in Viet Nam than ever before—and the enemy is still advancing.

As pointed out by Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers, President Johnson was just as deaf to CIA assessments. Ellsberg showed that Johnson had not lacked accurate intelligence estimates from the CIA before he escalated the war.

"The decisions seemed to have been made year after year in the light of what was adequate information to

make better decisions. If the President had this information available, why did he ignore it? Why did he listen to Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy as experts on Viet Nam instead of people who had a very good track record for prediction?"

The later Anderson Papers shed some light on Presidential decision-making. The official documents that were brought to light by columnist Jack Anderson center on the recent war between Pakistan and India. They showed the CIA once again providing a realistic estimate of the situation and a President once again choosing to ignore it. Nixon wanted Pakistan to win and ordered all hands to "tilt" against India, even tho he was warned that it was a losing cause.

Key Committee Role

Now that Presidential brinksmanship has spurred Congress to reassert its war making powers, it is imperative that key committees, such as Foreign Relations and Armed Services, have dependable intelligence on which to act. No time should be lost in passing the Cooper bill to bring this about.

This legislation, introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper [R., Ky.], would require the CIA to share its reports "fully and currently" with the appropriate committees on Capitol Hill. "I contend," says Cooper, "that the Congress, which must make decisions upon foreign policy and national security and which is called upon to commit material and human resources of the nation, should have access to all available information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our government and its people."

The CIA briefings Congress gets now are limited to what the administration wants it to know. There is a so-called "watchdog committee" [a small informal group of senators and congressmen] that is supposed to keep an eye on the CIA, but it didn't hold a single meeting all last year. It will be said that Congress can't be trusted for sensitive information. Well, the greatest secrets of all, involving nuclear develop-

BEST COPY
Available

According to an official estimate recently presented to Congress, the foreign intelligence-gathering activities of the CIA, the military services, and sundry mysterious agencies of the Federal Government cost the taxpayers about \$3 billion a year. A less official but probably more realistic estimate current on Capitol Hill places the cost of these operations at about twice that amount. Except for a few favored members of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, no one in Congress knows precisely where in the Federal budget these appropriations are hidden, or how much they amount to, or what they produce.

Senator John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky Republican, is sponsoring legislation that would require the CIA to provide the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees with the same reports it now furnishes to the White House—"fully and currently," as his bill states. The Senator makes a persuasive case, maintaining that "the Congress, which must make decisions on foreign policy and national security, which is called upon to commit the material and human resources of the nation, should have access to all available information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our Government and its people."

Far less persuasive is Senator Cooper's contention that members of these committees can—and should—be counted on to keep such information secret from their constituents. In the last analysis, aren't *all* Americans responsible for "decisions on foreign policy and national security"? Aren't *all* Americans called upon to "commit the material and human resources of the nation"—*their* material and human resources? Therefore, shouldn't *all* Americans have access to "available information and intelligence"?

If the American people had known all the facts about Indochina eight or ten years ago, they might not have acted any more wisely than the national security managers who were privy to the data. But they could hardly have acted more foolishly.

ST. LOUIS, MO.
GLOBE-DEMOCRAT

MORNING - 292,789

WEEKEND - 306,889

APR 23 1972

Edward W. O'Brien

Soviet spying unmasks

WASHINGTON — It's not fashionable any longer to apply the term "Cold War" to the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Semantics aside, the two super-powers are in fact in a great struggle for what each considers to be stakes of the highest value. Tangled though the Vietnam war issues are, one issue surely is the future role of Washington and Moscow in the future of Southeast Asia.

In other parts of the world, the struggle takes varied forms, one of them being the collection of information — or, bluntly, espionage. It is for this purpose that American taxpayers appropriate hundreds of millions of dollars annually to the Central Intelligence Agency and possibly larger amounts to military intelligence organizations.

A few years ago, the CIA was a high-priority target in this country of many Leftists, who said the United States should not soil its hands on dirty tricks against the Kremlin.

RECENTLY, DOMESTIC ATTACKS on the CIA have subsided, partly because of its discreet and effective director, Richard Helms, who has succeeded in disarming most congressional critics of CIA by informing them honestly and fully about his agency's findings and conclusions.

How about the other side?

As often happens in such matters, little has been said publicly in the United States about Russian espionage operations except for an occasional brief headline when the FBI catches a Soviet agent in the act.

Now the Senate Internal Security subcommittee has published a priceless tool for any American with a serious interest in Soviet intelligence and security operations.



O'Brien

THE SUBCOMMITTEE BOOK is a 289-page list and summary of published materials about achievements of Soviet intelligence agencies. The notable aspect of all this is that most of the materials were published in and by the Soviet itself, in books, magazines, and newspapers.

Until eight years ago, the Russians maintained their traditional policy of silence about their espionage activities. Premier Nikita Khrushchev, for example, declared in 1962 that the Soviet was not engaging in espionage because it did not intend to attack anyone and therefore did not need such information.

But on Sept. 4, 1964, the Senate study states, "the Soviet Union did a dramatic reversal, and since then there has been a spate of articles and books extolling the Soviet intelligence and security services and creating a new pantheon of heroes—the staunch protectors of the fledgling Communist regime of the 1918-1921 period and the intrepid intelligence operatives spying abroad during the inter-war period at great personal sacrifice and danger for the Soviet fatherland."

THE FIRST OF THE NEW heroes was Richard Sorge, who spied brilliantly for the Soviet in Tokyo just before and during World War II. He was discovered, tortured, and executed by the Japanese in 1944.

Once the publicity barrier was down, many other spies were deified. Rudolf Abel, who was convicted in New York in 1957 and later sent back to Moscow in a prisoner exchange, was glorified as another Sorge by the KGB, the Soviet security service.

"The admission to the Soviet people that the KGB — long portrayed to them as an internal, defensive arm of the state — does in fact engage in peacetime spying abroad was even more dramatic than the revelations of the activities of military intelligence," The Senate study said.

Some of the Soviet books and articles are available in English translation from the Commerce Department's Joint Publications Research Service here. Even the brief descriptions in the Senate compilation provide a rare glimpse into an obscure side of the all too real world.

WOODBURY, N.J.

TIMES APR 18 1972

E - 21,314

Congress Should Know

The Daily Times fervently hopes that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will report favorably on a bill requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to provide certain Congressional committees with the same intelligence reports and analyses the Agency furnishes regularly to the White House.

And we hope the Senate takes prompt favorable action on the measure, too. The bill was introduced last year by Senator Cooper of Kentucky.

If Congress is to assume or, more properly, re-assume its role in the foreign policy process, it must have adequate information.

The average U.S. citizen hasn't the foggiest notion what the CIA is doing or where it is doing it. This secrecy might very well be essential to the agency's function. But the U.S. intelligence gathering operations cost the American taxpayer up to \$6 billion annually and, at the very least, the taxpayers are entitled to some assurance that this intelligence information and analysis is furnished to their elected representatives who serve on the Congressional Committee vitally concerned.

The Pentagon papers illustrated the fact that some intelligence assessments are sometimes at odds with White House policies.

Moreover, a CIA official has disclosed

that his agency has been furnishing highly secret intelligence on world atomic developments to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee for 15 years without a breach in security.

Actually it is time that Congress established close scrutiny of all intelligence operations.

Back in 1967, the CIA tried to head off similar legislation by inviting three members of the Foreign Relations Committee to attend joint briefings of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees which are now responsible for overseeing intelligence matters. But not a single meeting of this group was called during all of last year.

We believe it is essential that at least some key members of Congress keep informed about what this secret arm of the Government is doing.

How else can Congress assume — and fulfill — its own responsibilities in the field of U.S. foreign policy?

12 April 1972

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

Bring The CIA To Heel

Although Congress in the foreign aid authorization bill signed earlier this year imposed some controls over the Central Intelligence Agency, the free wheeling CIA still operates without much accountability to the legislative branch of government. Its budget remains secret. And only last month a study by the General Accounting revealed that Agency for International Development funds intended for public health use in Laos were being diverted to the CIA for use in the guerrilla war in that country.

The record of CIA disdain for the will of Congress underscores the importance of Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on a bill proposed by Senator John Sherman Cooper which would oblige the agency to provide congressional committees dealing with armed services and foreign policy "fully and currently" with both intelligence information and evaluations affecting foreign relations and national security. Two former CIA officials, Dr. Herbert Scoville and Chester L. Cooper, testifying for the bill, said the agency should provide Congress with the same analyses it now regularly provides the White House.

At present CIA briefings of Congress are provided only as sanctioned by the White House. Since Congress also has authority in foreign relations and military affairs, there is justification for giving the legislators access to CIA data. Indeed, its machinations in the military and political affairs of other countries suggest that it has arrogated to itself so many improper policy-making initiatives that the agency should be either be abolished or restricted by law to intelligence gathering alone.

Secrets of the CIA

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is considering a bill seeking to force the Central Intelligence Agency to cut Congress in on the same secret reports it makes to the White House. The Nixon administration opposes the legislation and proponents concede it would be difficult to override a Presidential veto.

The administration appears to fear that if 535 members of the House and Senate got this information it wouldn't be secret very long and that the principal beneficiary might be Jack Anderson, the muckraking columnist, who has a great itch to read secret papers.

Among the supporters of the bill is Sen. Charles H. Percy of Illinois, who had an interesting argument why members of Congress need all the information they can get. He confessed to voting wrong on the supersonic transport and the antiballistic missile defense system, both of which he opposed, stating that he had been misled by "fallacious" information.

We suppose it is better to find out late that you were wrong than never.

LEXINGTON, KY.

HERALD

M - 52,174

HERALD-LEADER

S - 73,977

APR 5 1972

Sen. Cooper And The CIA

Sen. John Sherman Cooper is one of the most responsible and experienced members of the U.S. Senate. His influence on foreign affairs is particularly telling.

So when the Kentucky Republican introduces a piece of foreign-policy legislation, his colleagues as well as the press generally take note.

Thus it is that Sen. Cooper's recently introduced bill requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to share its reports "fully and currently" with the military and foreign-affairs committees on Capitol Hill was the subject of the lead editorial in Sunday's Washington Post.

Said the Post: "No more useful piece of foreign-policy legislation has been drafted since Congress got its dander up . . ."

Opening hearings on the measure, Sen. Cooper declared, "I contend that the Congress which must make decisions upon foreign policy and national security, which is called upon to commit the material and human resources of the nation, should have access to all available

information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our government and its people."

Cooper would require the CIA to keep Congress as well as the Executive informed, just as the Atomic Energy Commission and Defense Department have been required to keep Congress' Joint Atomic Energy Committee informed in that field since 1946.

It seems to us that Sen. Cooper is quite right to regard the CIA as an agency of disinterested specialists providing a necessary and valuable product, intelligence, which Congress has reason and right to share.

The exemplary record of Congress in dealing with atomic energy makes it untenable to claim that Congress can't keep secrets. The overriding point is that Congress cannot make good decisions if it does not have good and timely information.

We trust that other senators and the Nixon Administration will look sympathetically upon Sen. Cooper's bill.

Congress and C.I.A.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings last week on a bill requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to provide the appropriate Congressional committees with the same intelligence analyses it regularly furnishes the White House. This legislation, introduced last year by Senator Cooper, ought to be expedited in the interests of strengthening the machinery of foreign policy.

As Congress reasserts its rightful role in the foreign policy process, it is essential that its members be as fully informed as possible. The respective Congressional committees are entitled to share the fruits of intelligence-gathering operations for which the American taxpayer is billed up to \$6 billion annually. These fruits include assessments which sometimes sharply challenge Executive policies, as the Pentagon Papers revealed.

There is ample precedent for Senator Cooper's proposal. A former C.I.A. official testified last week that the agency has been furnishing highly classified intelligence on world atomic developments to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee for fifteen years, with no security breaches. Even now, senior agency officials provide oral briefings to other committees on request but only with White House approval. Congress could better discharge its own constitutional responsibilities in the foreign policy field if it had full and direct access to this information.

Beyond the Cooper bill, it is high time Congress revived its languishing effort to establish closer scrutiny of intelligence operations. In a move designed to sidetrack legislation with this aim, the Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 was invited to send three members to the C.I.A. joint briefings held by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, which are currently responsible for overseeing intelligence activities. But no meetings of this group were called during all of last year—an "oversight" of frightening dimensions.

It is not enough for Congress to know what the C.I.A. is saying. It is also essential that at least key members of the legislative branch, which provides the funds for worldwide intelligence-gathering and other undercover operations, keep informed about what, in general, this secret arm of the United States Government is doing.

Freedom, Ah, It's Wonderful

STATOTHR

Sharp indeed is the contrast between the suppression of public information in countries behind the iron curtain in Eastern Europe and the bamboo shield in Asia when one considers the goldfish bowl operation of government in these United States. Nevertheless dissenters and critics, whether motivated by politics, sincere convictions or plain antagonism toward the American way of life, are raising their voices to a high pitch and their targets are numerous and varied.

Approaching the ultimate is a movement now underway to require the Central Intelligence Agency, top secret arm of the federal government, divulge to Congress its most confidential and sensitive reports. And John A. McCone, former CIA director has not only endorsed the legislation, which the Nixon administration opposes, but has committed himself to testify in support of it in an anticipated Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.

The role of the CIA in Southeast Asia has cropped up incidentally from time to time and its imprint has been visible in the Middle East as well as in Latin America, most recently in connection with alleged efforts to counter the Allende regime's communizing of Chile and the confiscation of valuable industrial properties owned by United States investors.

Veils of secrecy, the rending of which lead to imprisonment in Soviet Russia, as illustrated by the recent imposition of prison terms of up to 18 years upon dissenters, naturally raise questions in American minds, but the character of CIA operations and their effectiveness with respect to the nation's security are vital considerations. And the blabbermouth tendencies of many members of Congress, including some of the most influential senators are well known.

If these men faithfully performed their duties fears of intolerable super secrecy would be needless.

Misconstruing liberty for license is a practice that has been carried to extremes, as witness an attempt by sympathizers of Father Philip Berrigan and his co-defendants in an alleged anarchistic conspiracy of shocking proportions to blockade the Harrisburg federal building where they have been on trial. And in this same connection, the arrival on that scene of Alger Hiss who served a much-too-short prison sentence for selling, while a top aide in the Department of State, secret information to Soviet Russia. His harangue outside the courthouse to the effect that the Berrigan case was another example of "McCarthyism" could hardly have been in poorer taste. And in this same connection, Berrigan sympathizers taking credit for damaging a number of shell casings at a York defense plant in protest against the waning Vietnam war added to the nausea.

Finally, Federal Judge Joseph Lord of Philadelphia ruled in recent days, over opposition of the federal government, that a dissenters' suit contesting the constitutionality of the Vietnam war is entirely in order and merits full judicial consideration. So a three-judge panel will conduct a belated post-mortem. The complications inherent in that litigation are too earth-shaking for ready comprehension, but there it is — more than a decade after the Kennedy administration involved the nation in the conflict.

America has been traditionally known as the bastion

Congress and the CIA

No more useful piece of foreign-policy legislation has been drafted since Congress got its dander up than Senator Cooper's bill requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to share its reports "fully and currently" with the military and foreign-affairs committees on Capitol Hill. "I contend," said Mr. Cooper, opening hearings, "that the Congress, which must make decisions upon foreign policy and national security, which is called upon to commit the material and human resources of the nation, should have access to all available information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our government and its people." Meaning to end the practice of arbitrary CIA briefings, he would require the CIA to keep Congress as well as the Executive informed, just as the Atomic Energy Commission and Defense Department have been required to keep the Joint Atomic Energy Committee informed in that field since 1946.

It seems to us Mr. Cooper is quite right to regard the CIA—at least, that largest part of it concerned with intelligence—not as a beast needing to be tamed, as many of its critics do; not as a baby needing to be coddled, as most members of the congressional "oversight" committees do; but as an agency of disinterested specialists providing a necessary and valuable product, intelligence, which Congress has reason and right to share. Such an approach accords with the CIA's known capabilities and it accords as well with the political realities: efforts to tighten legislative oversight have traditionally failed.

Mr. Cooper has taken an undogmatic approach to such essential questions as what part of the CIA

paper factory's product should be made available, by what procedures, with what security arrangements, and so on. He hopes to avoid a constitutional challenge, noting that since Congress created the CIA, it can direct it to share its output. No substantial question of executive privilege is involved, in his view, since Congress would not be asking for the advice the President receives from his lieutenants but for the information on which the advice is based. Further hearings will explore these sub-issues.

The overriding point remains that Congress cannot make good decisions if it does not have good and timely information. The CIA is the logical place to look: it is charged with collating all intelligence produced within the government and, unlike the Executive departments which deal in the critical fields of weapons, military aid or arms control, it has (in those fields) no operational responsibilities and hence no incentive to shape its intelligence to fit its own departmental programs. The exemplary record of Congress in dealing with atomic energy makes it untenable to claim that Congress can't keep secrets. Anyway, everyone knows that it's the Executive branch which does most of the leaking. Regular provision of CIA information to Congress would probably tend to limit the practice of self-serving Executive leaks.

We trust the President will look sympathetically upon this bill introduced by one of the most responsible and experienced members of his own party and realize its potential advantages to the Congress and to the nation as well.

STATOTHR

PROVIDENCE, R.I.
BULLETIN

E - 149,463

APR 1 1972

CIA Information

One of the recurring criticisms of the Central Intelligence Agency is that despite the hundreds of millions of dollars it spends to gather information, the distribution of that information is so limited that Congress has little benefit from it. A remedy for this gap has been proposed by a former CIA official, Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., once deputy director for research, has suggested that the same intelligence and analyses be supplied to appropriate congressional committees as now goes to the White House. He argues that while much information is provided by the executive branch to Congress, it is subject to distortion by administrative officials.

There are two aspects of such a development that raise questions. One is the issue of security. But Dr. Scoville pointed out that CIA intelligence has been submitted regularly to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy for years, as required by statute, without any breaches of security. The other is the danger of congressional members being overwhelmed with a mass of information.

To solve the latter problem, another former CIA official, Chester L. Cooper, proposes that representatives of the CIA be assigned to the congressional committees to screen out the important material and bring it to their attention. The material wouldn't

be available to everybody, but only to those committees dealing with foreign affairs and national security.

In a period when Congress is insisting that it be given a larger voice in the direction of foreign policy and those activities likely to involve the United States in international conflict, it is vital that its members be fully informed. In the recent past, the accumulation of power in the White House has left Congress all too often in the dark or able to obtain only what information the executive feels it should have.

Many critics in Washington feel that the CIA and its activities should be controlled directly by the State Department, except perhaps for clandestine activities, which should be directed separately. There have been many indications in the past decade that the CIA operates independently of the State Department and, as a result, has a tendency to make its own foreign policy. While the State Department's state of eclipse is such today that it is scarcely in a position to assert greater control over the CIA, increased reporting to Congress might at least keep Congress in closer touch with the realities of power in the federal government and enable it to make sounder decisions on policies to be followed by both agencies.

CHARLOTTE, N.C.
NEWS

E - 65,014

MAR 3 1 1972

Informing The Congress

If the power of Congress as one of the three equal branches of government has waned in recent times, it is in part because the legislators don't always have sufficient information to make sound decisions, much less to exert influence. Nowhere is this more true than in the field of foreign affairs.

The President, of course, is granted the authority to make foreign policy, but at the same time the Congress holds the constitutional power to make war. Obviously these roles overlap. Nonetheless, it is past time for Congress to re-assert its prerogatives. A beginning would be to demand information.

A bill which would accomplish that to some degree has been introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) The bill calls for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to inform "fully and currently" the committees in the House and Senate concerned with military and foreign affairs. In Cooper's words, it would grant some members of Congress "access to all available information and intelligence" so that the legislature "can discharge properly and morally" its responsibility.

That doesn't seem unreasonable, although the Nixon administration opposes the measure for reasons not altogether clear. Certainly it would seem members of the select committees involved could be trusted with the highly classified information. It is realized, of course, that in a body as large as Congress, there will be a few blabbermouths. Still, it seems

Cooper's Bill Deserves A Full And Fair Hearing

well worth the risk that a secret might be compromised. The alternative is for Congress to keep operating without benefit of this information.

The Pentagon Papers have demonstrated that the Vietnam War might have been prosecuted differently, or not at all, had all information been known to Congress and not just information which LBJ wanted Congress to have. Much the same can be said of warlike actions against Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

The Cooper bill may have rough sledding, but it has picked up support from impressive, if unexpected, sources. This week two former senior CIA officials recommended that the CIA maintain liaison with the Congress on a regular basis. At the same time one charged that the administration "misused" intelligence in 1969 when it asserted the Russians were on the verge of having a first-strike capability.

It is still too early to endorse the bill; more debate is clearly called for. Yet some type of guarantee that the Congress will be informed is necessary and this bill may be the vehicle. Hopefully it will get a full hearing.

LOUISVILLE, KY.
COURIER JOURNAL

M - 239,949
S - 350,303

~~MAR 3 1 1972~~

CIA finally ready to talk?

EVEN OUR SPIES now doubt the wisdom of whispering their secrets into the ears of only one man and giving him exclusive control over that ultimate tool of foreign policy—war.

At least that's the interpretation many observers have placed on John A. McCone's endorsement of Senator John Sherman Cooper's bill to require the Central Intelligence Agency to turn over its secret intelligence reports to Congress. Although Mr. McCone no longer runs the CIA, the agency's former directors are known to be a close-knit group who almost never take a public position which is opposed by the incumbent director.

Since Mr. McCone committed himself the other day to testify in favor of the bill before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it's widely believed that he'll be saying what the current CIA director, Richard Helms, would say if he could. The Nixon administration opposes Senator Cooper's bill, and Mr. Helms, if he values his job, must keep silent.

The bill was introduced last July, after publication of the Pentagon Papers revealed that a succession of presidents had deceived the

public and the Congress about the situation in Vietnam. The papers also revealed that the CIA—which over the years had been blamed for many of our failures in Indochina—had, in fact, consistently expressed a skeptical view of our Vietnam policy from the Truman to the Nixon administrations. Acting contrary to intelligence reports that they alone could see, and gulling Congress and the public into blind support of their policies, these presidents eventually gave us our longest and most futile war.

Senator Cooper's bill—which would require the CIA to make regular reports to four congressional committees and supply other information on demand—should prevent a recurrence of those monstrous errors. Mr. McCone's endorsement of the bill is an encouraging sign that such a return to presidential and congressional responsibility isn't impossible.

SENATOR SOAPER SAYS one reason the pandas will go to the Washington Zoo is that the climate there is good for pandas. We had always wondered what it might be good for.

29 MARCH 1972

A Matter of Intelligence

Diplomatic dealing and higher-level statecraft often require attentive alertness, but it has sometimes happened that even the most astute leaders outsmarted themselves because they underestimated their own intelligence.

Successive recent Presidents of the United States, for instance, either discounted or downgraded perceptive professional intelligence estimates about Vietnam—the dismal details are fully recorded in some of the Pentagon papers—and it is clearly lamentable that some of the more prescient counsel went no further than the files.

There are many such reasons why the Central Intelligence Agency's anal-

yses of various foreign policy problems should be more widely accessible, and some of the organization's unhonored prophets seem to agree. Former director John A. McCone is apparently speaking for them as well as himself in supporting a pending bill that would provide key Congressional committees with CIA estimates and even some special surveys.

Since the American public is paying for this advice, its representatives are fully entitled to more than a fleeting look, and it is quite possible that far better informed Congressional opinion would result—whatever the prevailing view at the White House.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400170001-1

Access by Hill To CIA Data Recommended

By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Staff Writer

Two former senior employees of the Central Intelligence Agency urged yesterday that selected congressional committees be provided regularly with CIA information and analysis concerning U.S. foreign relations and "matters of national security."

The ex-CIA men, Chester L. Cooper and Herbert Scoville Jr., testified at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing convened to discuss a bill introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to amend the National Security Act of 1947.

The bill, a variation of previous congressional efforts to supervise the U.S. intelligence community, calls for the CIA to "inform fully and currently" the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees of the House of Representatives as well as the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees.

Speaking in defense of his proposal, Sen. Cooper said that it "would not affect in any way or inquire into the intelligence gathering activities of the CIA, its methods, sources, funds or personnel."

Its main purpose, the senator explained, is to give Congress "access to all available information and intelligence" so that the legislature can "discharge properly and morally its responsibility."

The Nixon administration has voiced its hostility to the bill in a State Department letter sent in January to Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), the Foreign Relations Committee chairman, saying that requiring the CIA to inform Congress is "incompatible" with the Secretary of State's role as principal foreign policy adviser to the President.

The State Department letter, described by Fulbright as "the most sweeping ever seen," also said that an obligation for the CIA to brief

Congress "would raise a constitutional question as to separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive Branches."

Chester Cooper, 55, a veteran of the CIA, the State Department and the White House who now works for the Institute of Defense Analyses, recommended yesterday that a special staff of "carefully" chosen officers serve as liaison men between the CIA and the congressional committees.

He warned against Congress demanding access to all intelligence studies, saying that "the mind boggles at the thought of truckloads of classified documents being delivered daily to the Senate and House mailroom."

The former CIA employee therefore suggested that Congress be authorized to receive the National Security Study Memoranda, an eclectic set of documents that contain a wide array of information and interpretation of current policy options.

The other committee witness, Scoville, 57, formerly the CIA's Director of Science and Technology, asserted that the administration has deliberately misused intelligence in its presentations to Congress to promote its own legislation.

Scoville alleged that administration spokesmen in 1969 sought to justify the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile program before Congress by reporting that the Soviet Union would soon acquire a "first-strike capability" that demanded endorsement of the U.S. program.

Disputing the administration argument that intelligence briefings raise a "constitutional question," Scoville said that the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee function in the realm of nuclear developments for years.

Both former CIA men cautioned the committee against having Congress provide the public with information given to its committees by the intelligence community.

Sources close to the committee also expressed fears privately that any intention on the part of Congress to release CIA intelligence to the public might result in the defeat of the bill.

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DATA TO CONGRESS FROM C.I.A. URGED

Two Ex-Agency Aides Back Bill to Require Reports

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 28—Two former officials of the Central Intelligence Agency urged Congress today to require the agency to provide it fully and currently with the same intelligence and analyses it now regularly provides the White House.

Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., a former Deputy Director for Research, noted that for 15 years the agency had been supplying the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee with highly classified intelligence on world atomic developments. There have been no security breaches, he said.

Dr. Scoville also suggested that regular briefings of Congressional committees dealing with foreign affairs would enhance—not jeopardize—national security.

At present, he said, both Congress and the public are dependent on the Administration for information, which is often "distorted" to suit Administration policies.

Would Screen Information

Chester L. Cooper, a former senior analyst on Vietnam for the agency and now an executive of the Institute for Defense Analyses here, urged that selected agent officers with experience on the National Security Council staff be assigned tours of duty with Congressional committees dealing with foreign and national security affairs.

These officers, he suggested, would screen what was important for Congress and thus prevent its being "drowned" in a flood of intelligence material—much of it irrelevant.

Mr. Cooper also urged congress to seek access to National Security Council study memorandums which, he noted, include not only intelligence but also other pertinent information relevant to policy decisions.

Dr. Scoville and Mr. Cooper testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was opening hearings today on a bill proposed by Senator John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky.

The measure, sponsored in the House by Representative Paul Findley, Republican of Illinois, would oblige the agency to provide Congressional committees dealing with armed services and foreign policy "fully and currently" with both intelligence information and evaluations affecting foreign relations and national security.

Senior agency officials provide frequent oral briefings on world affairs at the request of Congressional committee chairmen, but these briefings are expressly sanctioned by the White House.

With the exception of the Atomic Energy Act, there is no legislation that requires the agency to disclose its operations or its findings to Congress.

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MAR 29 1972

A Matter of Intelligence

Diplomatic dealing and higher-level statecraft often require attentive alertness, but it has sometimes happened that even the most astute leaders outsmarted themselves because they underestimated their own intelligence.

Successive recent Presidents of the United States, for instance, either discounted or downgraded perceptive professional intelligence estimates about Vietnam—the dismal details are fully recorded in some of the Pentagon papers—and it is clearly lamentable that some of the more prescient counsel went no further than the files.

There are many such reasons why the Central Intelligence Agency's anal-

yses of various foreign policy problems should be more widely accessible, and some of the organization's unhonored prophets seem to agree. Former director John A. McCone is apparently speaking for them as well as himself in supporting a pending bill that would provide key Congressional committees with CIA estimates and even some special surveys.

Since the American public is paying for this advice, its representatives are fully entitled to more than a fleeting look, and it is quite possible that far better informed Congressional opinion would result—whatever the prevailing view at the White House.

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MAR 29 1972

Bill Would Bare CIA Secrets

John A. McCone, a former Central Intelligence Agency director, has indorsed a bill that would require the CIA to turn over its supersecret intelligence reports to Congress.

His indorsement indicates the CIA has abandoned its longstanding opposition to the circulation of its secrets outside the executive branch.

Aides to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported that McCone had committed himself to testifying in favor of the bill. The aides said the Nixon administration had registered its opposition to the bill, thereby preventing the current CIA director, Richard M. Helms, a presidential appointee, from taking a position on it.

McCone backs bill to give Congress CIA reports

By Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — John A. McCone, a former Central Intelligence Agency director, has endorsed a bill that would require the CIA to turn over its secret intelligence reports to Congress.

His endorsement indicates that the CIA has abandoned its long-standing opposition to the circulation of its secrets outside the executive branch.

Aides to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported Monday that McCone had committed himself to testifying in favor of the bill during hearings starting Tuesday. The aides said the Nixon administration had registered its opposition to the bill, thereby preventing the current CIA director, Richard M. Helms, a presidential appointee, from taking a position on it.

Indirect support

But McCone's testimony is sure to be interpreted as indirect CIA support of the bill. Former directors of the agency, a loyal and tightly knit group, rarely, if ever, take a public position that the incumbent director opposes.

The bill was introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) last July, shortly after the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Sun-Times and other newspapers published the Pentagon papers. The papers revealed that the CIA consistently expressed a skeptical view of Vietnam from the Truman to the Nixon administrations. Cooper and other senators argued that Congress might have blocked the deep U.S. involvement if it had received the intelligence estimates.

Regular reports

Cooper's bill would require the CIA to make regular re-

ports to the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. It also would require the CIA to provide special information on request.

Tuesday's witnesses will be Chester Cooper, former intelligence analyst for the CIA and the White House, and Herbert Scoville, former head of the CIA's research division.

Sec. of State William P. Rogers, who has asserted the right to testify for the CIA, has been asked to appear after the Easter recess to present the administration's position. He may send a subordinate but presumably not Ray Cline, head of the department's bureau of intelligence and research.

An ITT director

Cline, a former deputy CIA director for intelligence, recently told the committee that he favored the distribution of CIA reports to Congress, provided the "sources and methods of intelligence gathering" were not jeopardized. Cooper insists that his bill provides adequate protection.

McCone is scheduled to testify next month. It may be the first in a series of appearances before the committee. As a director of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., he is a potential witness in the committee's planned investigation of the involvement of major corporations in U.S. foreign policy.

According to memos released by columnist Jack Anderson, McCone was given reports on ITT negotiations with the CIA to devise a plan for blocking the installation of Salvador Allende, a Marxist, as President of Chile in 1970.

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THE ROAD TO PEKING

Nixon's role in the triumph of Chou

By STAN CARTER
NEWS Diplomatic Correspondent

Fifth of a series

ONE of the eight black-bound loose-leaf volumes that President Nixon studied in preparation for his journey to Peking contained a top secret analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency of the strange and still only partially explained events in China last fall—and the effect that the internal power struggle they revealed may have on his summit talks with the surviving Communist leaders.

What went on in China in mid-September is still shrouded in mystery. Communist cadres in the provinces have been told that Defense Minister Lin Piao—until then the regime's no. 2 man—was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate party Chairman Mao Tse-tung and that when the plot failed, Lin and his cohorts were killed in a plane crash in Mongolia while trying to flee to the Soviet Union.

A British-built Trident jetliner, one of four purchased by China from Pakistan and used exclusively by high-ranking Chinese officers, did indeed crash in Mongolia, 100 miles beyond the Chinese border, on the night of Sept. 12. But American analysts doubt that Lin was among the seven men and two women whose bodies were recovered from the airplane, burned beyond recognition.

But it is clear that the power struggle has ended—at least for the time being—and that a moderate faction led by Premier Chou En-lai triumphed over a radical faction led by Lin Piao. Lin and hundreds of his followers have been purged, but are thought to be still alive.

Whatever the reasons for the purge, the timing for it seems to have been sparked by Chou's invitation to Nixon to visit the People's Republic of China.

Quarrel over resources

Despite the high classification of the CIA report, its conclusions are probably similar to those of analysts from other government agencies and from experts outside the government.

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For example, Rand Corp. Sinologist William W. Whitson has come up with a theory fitting the known facts. It suggests that the power struggle was the culmination of a debate within the Chinese hierarchy over allocation of resources to China's nuclear weapons program—and that Chou's victory over Lin will make China less of a threat to U.S. allies in Asia in the immediate future than it has been considered in the past.

Whitson, a military specialist, is one of those China experts who does research for the government and also maintains ties with the academic community. His new book, "The Chinese High Command, 1927-1971—a History of Communist Military Politics," will be published this spring.

According to Whitson, Lin Piao vigorously opposed last year's decision by Chou—with Mao's concurrence—to reduce tensions with the United States.

The reason was that Lin and his supporters in the Air Force and Navy needed the supposed American threat to justify development of bigger and bigger nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to deliver them.

The cost of China's nuclear and missile programs are 2% of the still underdeveloped country's total national product—so high that Whitson argues that "some people across the river (a euphemism in Washington for CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.) say that we ought to encourage them to keep at it, because it will make them go bankrupt."

Challenge to Lin

Whitson's contention is that Chou En-lai, in contrast to Lin, recognized that the real threat to China was from Russia—which had massed one million troops on China's northern border and threatened a "surgical strike" against Chinese nuclear installations—instead of from the United States, which the premier could see was in fact withdrawing from Southeast Asia.

To cope with the Soviet threat, China needed tactical nuclear weapons as well as more modern conventional armament—not necessarily long-range ICBMs. Therefore, it is Whitson's belief that Chou wanted to slow down the costly advanced weapons program and thus welcomed Nixon's overtures to end the 23-year-old confrontation between the United States and China.

But the invitation to Nixon presented a challenge to Lin and the generals associated with past strategic planning. Whitson puts it this way:

"To many of the senior officers of the second military generation, probably including Lin Piao, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng and Huang Yung-sheng, the historical image of the United States as the principal adversary most heavily armed with nuclear weapons targeted against China must have been the cornerstone of their premises for strategic planning and weapons development.

"President Nixon's visit to China could not have been a welcome shift in the image that had presumably guided their strategic thinking for 20 years."

Smaller bangs

Since the mid-1960s, China has exploded 13 nuclear devices, including three hydrogen bombs with yields of three megatons each, in 1968, 1969 and 1970. But the last two tests, in November, 1971 and January of this year, were of smaller devices with yields of 20 kilotons or less—the size of the Hiroshima A-bomb.

According to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the latest two tests could either have been of triggers for larger thermonuclear weapons or of prototypes of comparatively small, tactical nuclear warheads. If they were the latter, it would tend to confirm Whitson's theory that Chou, after defeating Lin, has shifted priorities to concentrate on medium and intermediate range missiles instead of a costly intercontinental missile arsenal.

"Such an emphasis would provide an immediate deterrent against the Soviet Union," Whitson says. "It would also promise the greatest intercontinental utility once an appropriate submarine or two had been built."

If Whitson is right, this will be disconcerting to U.S. military planners, who have advocated construction of an antiballistic missile defense system for protection of the United States against Chinese ICBM's expected to be operational as early as 1975, as much as against the nuclear-tipped Soviet intercontinental rockets already in their underground silos.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird acknowledged to Congress this week that "we don't know" the strategic nuclear threat posed by the People's Republic of China, or how that threat will evolve through the 1970s." But Laird said the

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Cloak and Dagger Hidden From Congress

The US intelligence network, a hydralike structure of which the Central Intelligence Agency is a major portion, has always been a headache for the executive and Congress. For the White House there has been the problem of management and co-ordination; for Congress the problem of determining accountability.

President Nixon has attempted to solve his management problem. Last week he announced a reorganization that would elevate CIA Director Richard Helms to a position of super-co-ordinator of all intelligence activities. He tied the whole apparatus more tightly into the National Security Council through a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee headed by presidential adviser Kissinger. Presumably the White House hopes to be better able to keep its thumb on intelligence operations and budgets, to suppress the petty jealousies that exist between such units as the FBI and the CIA and to cut down on the competitive duplication of work

done by various intelligence organizations both in and out of the military. It is a valiant attempt. Former Defense Secretary McNamara tried it within the Pentagon structure and achieved only a modicum of success.

The administration moves, however, do not solve the needs of the money granting body, Congress. In fact, Senators Fulbright and Symington Thursday expressed strong fears that tucking the intelligence community more firmly into the White House structure will withdraw it even further from congressional monitoring.

Their point is well taken. Right now there are few requirements for the CIA to tell Congress what it is doing. Its budget is secreted in other agencies. There is every reason to believe that Kissinger will refuse to testify before Congress as he has before, claiming executive privilege. Traditional congressional checks are missing. And that is a dangerous situation.

1 NOV 1971

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BY STEWART ALSOP

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OUR TURN TO BLINK?

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WASHINGTON—It is highly likely that one of these days soon, probably before Christmas, quite possibly before Thanksgiving, CIA director Richard Helms will call the White House and ask for an urgent appointment with the President. A great deal will then depend on what Helms tells President Nixon, and what President Nixon decides to do about it.

Helms, of course, is the No. 1 man in the U.S. intelligence community. The intelligence community is braced for "the other shoe to drop." The other shoe is a series of Soviet missile tests that the intelligence specialists are sure—rather mysteriously sure—will take place before the end of this year, most probably in November or early December.

These tests will tell a great deal about the real purpose of the very great Soviet investment in offensive strategic weapons. This investment is the first shoe, and it is symbolized by the missile silos—"holes," they are called in the intelligence trade—that the Russians have been constructing with extraordinary urgency throughout this year. The tests will show what kind of missiles the Russians intend to put in their holes.

PEACE AND THE HOLES

This is not, admittedly, a subject that much interests most people in the present, curious mood of this country. But it is a subject that has to interest the intelligence specialists—and the President, too. For what goes into the Russian holes may well determine whether or not it is rational to hope for what the President likes to call "a generation of peace."

The facts about the holes are as follows (and these facts are indeed facts, for the Pentagon's reconnaissance satellites bring back pictures of the holes almost as detailed as a picture of a building across the street). A total of 91 new holes has been dug so far this year. Twenty-five of these new holes are very large—larger than the holes that used to be dug for the huge, 25-megaton SS-9 missile. Sixty-six of the holes are somewhat smaller than the regular SS-9 holes but larger than the holes for the 1-megaton SS-11 missile.

These smaller holes are dug in a big circle, with ten missiles to a circle. In the middle of a half dozen or so of these circles, a very big hole, bigger than any missile silo ever built, has

been dug. None of the holes has as yet been fitted with a missile, and the experts do not expect them to be operational until about July 1972.

There are no doubt innumerable papers marked Top Secret filled with details about the Russian holes, but the essential facts are as stated above. These facts make it possible for any reasonably intelligent reader of this magazine to be his own intelligence analyst. What are the holes for?

WHAT ARE THEY FOR?

It is very unlikely that they are simply for more first-generation SS-9s and SS-11s. Otherwise, the missiles would already be in their holes. They could be for improved versions of the SS-9 and the SS-11. Or they could be for entirely new weapons.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the Russians want to do one thing to improve the SS-9, and another thing to improve the SS-11. The SS-9, or an entirely new version of the big missile, could be provided with multiple warheads, or "MIRVed." Because its warhead is so immense, the missile could be MIRVed six, or even ten times over. Given sufficient accuracy, even a relatively small number of MIRVed multi-megaton missiles could be used to destroy, in a first strike, this country's main strategic deterrent—our 1,000 land-based Minuteman missiles.

Greatly improved accuracy for the SS-11, or some new version of such a missile, would have a similar effect. The SS-11 is an "anti-city" weapon; it is only roughly accurate, since only rough accuracy is required to destroy a city with a 1-megaton warhead. But if it could be rendered accurate enough to dig a Minuteman missile out of its concrete silo, then it too would become a direct threat to our strategic deterrent.

How about the enormous new holes? The reader's guess may be as good as the specialists', for the specialists do not pretend to have the answer. These huge holes could be for hardened control centers. Or they could be for some new kind of offensive strategic missile, perhaps filled with penetration aids to blind the U.S. defense, perhaps with an enormous warhead designed to black out the defense's radar and control systems. Nobody knows.

After the expected tests, a lot more will be known, for the tests tell us al-

most as much as they tell the Russians about such factors as accuracy, range and megatonnage. Suppose the tests show (a) a MIRVed SS-9-type missile, (b) greatly improved accuracy for the SS-11-type missile; and (c) an entirely new offensive strategic missile of immense size. Even if the tests showed only one or two of these things, Richard Helms would have to ask for that urgent appointment with the President. What would the President do then?

Already, it is too late to talk about missile "parity." The Russians have 1,600 intercontinental missiles against 1,054 American missiles, and in terms of missile megatonnage, they have between five and ten times the thermonuclear capacity we have. Their anti-ballistic-missile complex is fully operational in the Moscow area and being urgently extended, whereas our ABM system will not be operational for several years.

A NEW CONFRONTATION

They are ready to produce an entirely new swept-wing attack bomber, with an undoubted "anti-U.S. attack capability," whereas our B-52s are Model T bombers, terribly vulnerable to the new SA-5 Soviet anti-aircraft. The Soviet Y-class nuclear submarine fleet of 41 boats now equals ours, and instead of halting production, the Russians have doubled their production capacity. The Soviet conventional fleet is already in several categories superior to ours.

The new Soviet missile tests could indicate at least the serious possibility that the Soviets are building up for a new eyeball-to-eyeball nuclear confrontation, like the 1962 Cuban crisis, in which it would be our turn to blink. The likely locale of the confrontation is obvious—the Middle East. It is easy to dismiss this possibility as mere Pentagon propaganda. But it is also silly.

The intelligence analysts, including the Pentagon's, have consistently underestimated the Soviet missile program. As for the President, his political future may be at stake. If he were to abandon hope for successful SALT talks and ask for very large new appropriations to regain nuclear parity with the Russians, he might well be throwing away his chance of re-election, in this country's present mood.

So what would the President do? If some of the gloomier analysts are right, what will the President do?

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Missile Myths - I

A Soviet First Strike?

by Herbert Scoville, Jr.

Now that the US and the USSR have agreed at the highest level to "concentrate this year on working out an agreement to limit the deployment of ABMs" and "to agree on certain measures with respect to the limitations of offensive strategic weapons," it is timely to clear away some of the myths which have been hampering success at SALT and providing fuel for the arms race. One such myth has been the widely trumpeted charges that the Russians were preparing a first strike against the US - a strategic attack on this country which would destroy a sufficient proportion of our strategic retaliatory forces that we would be either unable or unwilling to respond. If the Soviets or we came to believe that they had this capability, then our deterrent, the heart of our strategic security, would have lost its credibility. Nuclear war would have become more likely and our vulnerability to nu-

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR. is Chairman of the Federation of American Scientists' Strategic Weapons Panel. Formerly he was Deputy Director for Research, CIA and Assistant Director for Science and Technology of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Part II of this report will appear in a forthcoming issue.

clear blackmail a reality. This fear of a first strike against our Minuteman ICBMs was a major factor in President Nixon's previous reluctance, (which now appears to have been partially overcome) to negotiate an ABM agreement without a simultaneous limitation on offensive weapons. [Laird said September 18 that the Russians in the last 10 months have undertaken, with "tremendous momentum," a buildup of both land- and sea-based missiles. When Laird gets specific in his report to Congress next January on the military budget, there will be, he predicts, no further talk of budget cutting, for the American people don't want to be "militarily inferior." Government officials, it is reported, say that 80 ICBM silos are being built in the Soviet Union, that the Soviet ICBMs already outnumber ours - 1500 to 1054 - and that they have or soon will have 25 operational missile-firing submarines (the US has 41). Numbers, of course, say nothing definitive about a first strike capability or intent. - The Editors].

Secretary Laird first raised the first-strike alarm in justifying the Safeguard ABM when he said on March 21, 1969 that the Soviet Union is "going for a first strike capability, and there is no question about it."

However, later, after testimony by Secretary Rogers and CIA Director Helms, he retreated to the position that the Russians were acquiring the forces that would provide them with such a capability.

Although we have no way of divining Soviet intentions, we must attempt to visualize a first-strike policy from the Soviet point of view. We must remember that a first strike that is only 50 percent or even 95 percent effective is a disaster for the Soviet Union, since few - or even one - thermonuclear explosions on its cities in retaliation would be a catastrophe. Knocking out all our Minuteman missiles but leaving us with a strong retaliatory force of submarine missiles and bombers is only an invitation to national suicide. Even if all our intercontinental bombers were also destroyed by Soviet submarine missiles, we would still be left with a retaliatory capability which could devastate the USSR. Thus, if the Soviets are serious in attempting to develop a first-strike capability, they must find some way to neutralize our Polaris submarines, to say nothing of our bombers based on carriers or overseas.

While the Soviets have a modest anti-submarine warfare program, they could not have a force which could destroy the Polaris fleet in this decade or probably the next and have apparently not even made a major effort to have one. Their only protection from Polaris missiles in the foreseeable future would be through an extensive nationwide ABM system that could shoot down essentially all retaliatory missiles; yet strangely, some time before Secretary Laird announced the Soviet intention to achieve a first-strike capability, the Russians stopped the deployment of their only ABM system, that around Moscow. They have only recently, more than three years later, resumed that deployment, but they could not have in this decade, and probably never, an operational system which they could count on for protection from completely unacceptable damage from the Polaris fleet alone.

The continued Soviet construction of about 50 to 60 very large SS-9 missile launchers a year was the primary evidence used to support the conclusion that the Soviets were seeking a first-strike capability. It was feared that about 500 of these missiles, each equipped with three MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles), could destroy 95 percent of the US Minuteman force in a first strike. The Russians had tested the SS-9 with three reentry vehicles beginning in August 1968, and US defense authorities suggested in 1969 that these were designed to knock out our Minuteman silos. They further argued that the only logical explanation for the continuing SS-9 buildup was a Soviet desire to achieve a first-strike capability. As time passed, this assumption evolved from theory to unquestioned gospel.

But is the desire to obtain a first-strike capability the most logical explanation for the

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Our most important economic task is the restoration of full employment. But the President's proposals will not do this. Our employment rate is more than 6 percent—more than 7 percent in California. Five million men and women are without jobs in America. I support Mr. Nixon's basic view that we must institute tax incentives to help create jobs. But that alone will not be enough. The 500,000 new jobs that he expects his tax package to create in the next 12 months will still leave 4½ million Americans unemployed; 5.4 percent of our labor force will be without work.

The President spoke in his September 9 address of creating 100 million jobs in 10 years. What we really need are 5 million jobs right now.

If we are to move rapidly toward full employment, the President's tax package should therefore be improved. The investment tax credit should be structured to encourage the development of systems and services that will meet our domestic needs. We should give top priority to tax incentives that will encourage civilian applications of aerospace and military technology. This will allow our defense industries to diversify, creating new jobs for those who had been thrown out of work.

I am disturbed by the marked disparity between the tax incentives proposed for the Nation's producers, and those designed to benefit its many millions of consumers. I believe consumer tax relief should be increased over and above the \$50 acceleration in personal exemptions that the President has proposed. His program represents only a 7-percent decrease in consumer taxes. A 10-percent cut would surely not be unreasonable, especially in view of the impending increases in social security taxes.

I cannot support the President's repeal of the 7-percent automobile excise tax. The floating of the dollar and the investment tax credit already give the automobile manufacturers substantial relief. I can see no reason to provide the auto industry with additional extraordinary benefits, particularly when other sectors of the economy, such as aerospace, have suffered far more serious setbacks during the current recession. I propose instead that the automobile excise tax be maintained, and that its proceeds be placed in a fund to be used for the development of urban mass transit. In this way, we can improve our Nation's transportation systems, boost employment, and render tremendous assistance to our cities without causing further damage to the environment.

As the price for the President's tax package, he has proposed delaying of family assistance and revenue sharing, continuing the freezing of Federal funds for such purposes as mass transit, urban renewal, public works, and health care, and to cutting back the Federal work force and foreign aid.

The President's cuts have been made in the wrong places, I believe.

We need not sacrifice vital domestic programs in order to place a lid on inflation. We should be cutting back unnecessary military and strategic arms expenditures. We seek to accelerate our

withdrawal from Vietnam. We should more vigorously and creatively to limit massive nuclear arms expenditures. And we should refuse to give aid and support to military dictatorships in countries like Greece and Pakistan.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

MR. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 9727) to regulate the dumping of material in the oceans, coastal, and other waters, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Spong). Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

H.R. 8687, a bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

MR. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

MR. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MR. STENNIS. Mr. President, am I recognized?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.

MR. STENNIS. Mr. President, what is the pending measure before the Senate?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending measure before the Senate is H.R. 8687, the military procurement authorization bill.

MR. STENNIS. I thank the Presiding Officer.

MR. President, I wish to thank the acting majority leader as well as the acting minority leader for their cooperation in getting this matter arranged and for the time I have had this morning while other matters were being disposed of.

We begin debate today on the annual military procurement bill. While varying views of individual committee members are reflected in certain amendments, the

bill was approved for reporting in the Committee on Armed Services by a vote of 10 to 0.

MR. President, the acting majority leader has mentioned to me the proposition of getting unanimous consent with reference to some amendments to be proposed on Monday, so that they be voted on on Monday. I am glad we can get started on these unanimous-consent agreements, and the acting majority leader may present that unanimous-consent request when he wishes to. Of course we would like to look at those amendments or know their substance beforehand.

As a general proposition, the purpose of the committee is to get this bill presented rather fully and to get into the Recon today, some of the general speeches and overall explanations. Some Members who were planning to speak in connection with the explanation of the bill cannot be here today, but they will be here very early next week. With the report that is presented here, which is extraordinarily complete, and with the explanations to be made today and Monday, I think that the full matter will be before the Senate. I hope we can move—I will not say rapidly—but with reasonable dispatch, in the consideration of these amendments, and dispose of them.

MR. President, the committee is prepared to enter into almost any unanimous-consent agreement that may be proposed as to limitations of time. Of course, there is always room for interpretation as to what may be considered reasonable under the circumstances and on the subject matter.

MR. President, I have a unanimous-consent request to make, now, which is the usual one made on bills of this kind. Preliminarily, although the bill before the Senate is the House bill—the House passed the bill and referred it to our committee, and we considered and reported the House bill—everything after the enacting clause was embraced in a substitute which is offered here as an amendment.

MR. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute be agreed to, and as agreed to be considered original text for the purpose of further amendment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears no objection, and it is so ordered.

MR. STENNIS. I thank the Presiding Officer and I thank the Senate. That is a step forward, even if it is the usual customary unanimous-consent request that is made.

MR. President, I believe that this bill, as reported, outlines an austere and prudent program for military procurement and for resource and development which should be funded now. The total requests which the committee considered in this bill amounted to \$22,128,337,000. The committee is recommending to the Senate an authorization of \$21,018,482,000, or a decrease of \$1,169,855,000. This is a committee reduction of 5.3 percent from the total budget request considered.



On the
Issues

CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPENDING

STATOTHR

Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA.

In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted.

The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this year's impetus.

✓ Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his briefing on a staff report. (*Weekly Report* p. 1709, 1660, 1268)

He told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war."

As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Senate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing.

If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, then what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? (*Secrets fact sheet*, *Weekly Report* p. 1785)

A Congressional Quarterly examination of the oversight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Congress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands of four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees—Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago.

The CIA Answers to...

As established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was accountable to the President and the National Security

Council. In the original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination.

To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intelligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organization in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a select group of ranking members of Congress. (*Congress and the Nation* Vol. I, p. 306, 249)

THE SENATE

In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straightforward. Nine men—on two committees—hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis.

Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations.

Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA budget, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations.

No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Woodruff said the material covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour."

Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

DETROIT, MICH.

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AUG 8 1971

CIA losing its veil of Secrecy

By GEORGE KENTERA
News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—Since it opened in the late 1950's, the headquarters of the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in nearby Virginia has been screened from public view by a border of woodland.

That screen is soon to be lost. The land is to be developed by the National Park Service for camping, hiking and picnicking. And even as CIA headquarters itself becomes more visible, an effort is beginning in Congress to open a window on the CIA activities within the building.

These developments on Capitol Hill point up the efforts...

The troubled reaction of some Senate members to the disclosure last week that the CIA and the United States were more deeply involved in a clandestine military action in Laos than was heretofore publicly known or believed.

The appointment of an anti-war Michigan congressman, Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D., to the chairmanship of a special House subcommittee on intelligence, and

his hope of staging open hearings on the CIA.

Action in Congress, already halfway through the legislative process, to put a halt to secret CIA financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which beam news behind the Iron Curtain.

NO MEMBER OF CONGRESS asks that the operations of the intelligence agency headed by Richard Helms be an open book. But some members are miffed about the unwillingness of the executive branch to share more information with Congress and the CIA is part of the irritant.

Helms himself recognizes this situation. In dealing with it, he went so far last April as to make a public speech, his first as CIA director, outlining his views.

He firmly denied that his agency was a law unto itself or an invisible government, "engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls."

The CIA is directly responsible to the National Security Council. But the agency long has contended that it is responsible to Congress as well because of its briefing to an informal group composed of some members of the Armed Services and Appropriations committees.

In his public speech here to members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Director Helms argued that this informal congressional group is "told more about our activities and our operations than is known to most of the personnel in our highly compartmented agency."

He added, "But how, in the end, we are to be answerable to Congress itself to decide."

However, some members of Congress do not feel, despite the informed briefings, that procedures exist that make the CIA at least partially accountable to Congress.

NEDZI SAID THE OTHER DAY, "My feeling is that the old subcommittee (the informal group) served more as a vehicle for the Chief Executive, to enable him to say he had consulted and advised Congress. But I'm not aware that there has been any congressional oversight of the CIA . . . I think it important that the window be opened a bit."

He said later, "Everybody appreciates that elements of restraint are involved. The difficulty is in drawing that line between the national security and public disclosure."

The effort to focus more attention on the CIA is part of a trend in recent years toward more public disclosure by the Congress.

This trend has seen public reporting of congressmen's net worth and income, liberalized rules in House and Senate, the adoption of recorded teller votes in the House, reform of campaign spending and reporting of that spending, and a move toward more open hearings of congressional committees.

Publication of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report on Laos last week indicated that CIA-supervised troops numbering more than 39,000 were actually bearing the brunt of the combat against the enemy in Laos.

IT BECAME KNOWN last week that the report had led Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Montana Democrat, to call an extraordinary secret session of the Senate June 7.

A transcript of that session was placed in the Congressional Record last Wednesday and it showed that the Nixon administration was accused of withholding information and misleading Congress about growing American involvement in the Laotian war.

Senator Stuart Symington, Missouri Democrat, told the Senate that U.S. military assistance to Laos had trebled since 1967 and was now 25 times as great as when it began in 1963.

"We have been appropriating money for this war in the blind," he said.

As for Nedzi, he said the Laotian disclosures suggest "there may be a need for legislation in this area, to restrain the CIA from becoming involved in this kind of thing."

"I can understand how it happened," he said, "but I can't justify in my own mind how it happened without Congress being aware of it."

As for Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts to Eastern Europe, and Radio Liberty, which broadcasts to Russia, the Senate has approved legislation providing \$35 million in fiscal 1972 for "open funding" of the stations, thereby eliminating, if the bill passes the House, funding by the CIA.

"The Senate has clearly shown," said Senator Clifford P. Case, New Jersey Republican and the bill's sponsor, that it will no longer abdicate its responsibilities in allowing the executive branch to pay out \$35 million a year (to the stations) without congressional authorization."

For 20 years the payments were made by the CIA.

DOVISH NEDZI'S NEW JOB

Overseer to Lift CIA's Lid

By ORR KELLY

Star Staff Writer

Shortly after Congress returns from its August recess, five congressmen will turn off the George Washington Memorial Parkway at an unmarked exit, swing back across the parkway on than overpass and suddenly emerge into a spacious, tree-dotted parking lot surrounding a gleaming white building.

Only after they have parked and entered the building will they see their first solid evidence -- inlaid into the floor in a giant seal -- that this is the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Heading the little group of congressmen will be Rep. Lucien Norbert Nedzi, a 46-year-old Democrat who has represented the eastern portion of Detroit since 1962, and who has just been named -- to the surprise of many -- as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on central intelligence.

Nedzi's record has not been the kind that would, on the surface, endear him to the more senior -- and generally more conservative -- members of the committee. He co-sponsored an end-the-war amendment in the House, has opposed the B1 bomber and the Safeguard missile defense system, and is one of a tiny group of rebels on the 41-man committee known as the Fearless Five.

Why did Rep. F. Edward Hebert, a Democrat from Louisiana, choose Nedzi for one of the most important subcommittee assignments -- a post traditionally held by the chairman himself?

Nedzi Explains Choice

"The chairman was generally interested in having a review of this area," Nedzi explained in an interview. "My experience with him has been excellent -- we understand each other. I know where he stands, and he knows where I stand; I have never deceived him and he has never reflected deception to me.

"He feels that we need to call a spade a spade and he feels I'll do just that."

Nedzi comes to his new assignment -- which will cover all intelligence agencies, not just the CIA -- with few preconceptions and, in fact, **Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400170001-1** edge of the field.

"The senior members were on the Central Intelligence subcommittee and we were not privy to their deliberations. We had absolutely no information on the budgets of the agencies or what they were up to. Periodically, we got intelligence reports," Nedzi said.

The five-man subcommittee was, in the past, made up of the chairmen of the full committee and the two senior members from each party. The senior members serving with Nedzi will be Reps. Melvin Price, D-Ill., O. C. Fisher, D-Tex., William G. Bray, R-Ind., and Alvin E. O'Konski, R-Wis.

Nedzi had some brief exposure to the intelligence field when he served on a special subcommittee looking into the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo by the North Koreans.

Has Met Helms

He has met Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, on several occasions when Helms has appeared before the committee and he thinks highly of him. But Nedzi has never visited the CIA, has never called on the CIA for a special intelligence briefing, and does not know Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the super-secret National Security Agency.

The only time a top intelligence official has appeared in an open hearing in the last decade, was on June 2, 1961 when Helms, then No. 2 man in the CIA, testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee. Normally, Helms and other CIA officials not only testify in closed hearings but their names and the name of their agency are deleted before a transcript on the hearing is made public.

Sets Priorities

Despite his lack of experience in the area, Nedzi has a pretty good idea of the areas he would like to explore and he listed them this way:

1 -- Is there too much overlapping of functions among the CIA and the State and Defense Department intelligence operations?

2 -- Are the budgets the proper size -- and does all the information get to the man who needs it when he needs it?

3 -- Are individual rights being protected? Nedzi is aware that military intelligence people have been told to cut out their domestic intelligence activities, but he wants to make sure the new rules are being obeyed.

4 -- Is it proper for the CIA to manage operations such as those in Laos?

"There is a question of whether we should be involved in such operations and the further questions of whether this agency is the proper one to do it," Nedzi said.

5 -- Should the whole system of security classification be revised?

"That this is a difficult area, I realize," Nedzi said, "and I'm not sure we're going to be able to come up with a Solomon-like decision."

6 -- How are the national intelligence estimates arrived at? What really is the basis for arriving at decisions?

Since his selection for the new job announced earlier this week, Nedzi said, his phone has been constantly busy with callers volunteering information about U.S. intelligence operations.

"We will give them an appropriate audience," he said. "We are hearing from people with all sorts of axes to grind. We'll screen them all for substance, but no one is peremptorily dismissed."

4 AUG 1971

War Critic

To Check

On CIA

United Press International

The pro-military chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has named an active antiwar congressman to head the subcommittee that keeps watch on the Central Intelligence Agency.

Chairman F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), turning down the post himself, appointed Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), a leading Pentagon critic, to head the special subcommittee on intelligence.

Asked why he chose Nedzi, Hebert said, "Because he's a good man, even though we're opposed philosophically."

Hebert's predecessor, the late L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.), considered the subcommittee chairmanship so important that he assigned himself to fill it.

Not only did Hebert not take the post, but he told Nedzi "to make periodic inquiries into all phases of intelligence activities within the Department of Defense and within the agencies established under the National Security Act, and to make legislative recommendations when appropriate."

Besides the CIA, Nedzi will have jurisdiction over the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, two highly secret branches of the Defense Department.

One of his first acts, said Nedzi, would be to hold public hearings on U.S. intelligence-gathering activities. An eight-year veteran of the full committee, he said Hebert had placed "no restrictions of any sort" on him.

One of his first goals, Nedzi said, would be "to reconcile the public's right to know with the national security."

Although the Michigan Democrat has been critical of the Vietnam war and Pentagon policies, he said he had a high regard for CIA Director Richard Helms.

"I have been tremendously impressed by Mr. Helms. From the few occasions he has appeared before the Armed Services Committee," Nedzi

Pentagon Critic Named To Keep Watch on CIA

One of the most active doves U.S. intelligence-gathering activities and Pentagon critics in the

House has been named chairman of a super-secret subcommittee charged with keeping tabs on the CIA and other intelligence agencies. He was appointed by the hawkish chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., said one of the first things he is going to do in his new job is visit the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley.

After that, said Nedzi, he hopes to hold public hearings on

As an eight-year member of the full committee, Nedzi has attended briefings by CIA directors from time to time.

The subcommittee he is taking over was considered so vital by Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., that the late chairman of the Armed Services Committee always reserved that chairmanship for himself. Not only did Rivers' successor, Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., pass up the post, but he expanded its jurisdiction.

Besides the CIA, Nedzi will have jurisdiction over the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, two hush-hush branches of the Pentagon.

Nedzi said in an interview Hebert had placed "no restrictions of any sort" on him, though he added it remained to be seen what the future would hold.

Why did Hebert pick him?

"Because he's a good man," said Hebert. "Even though we're opposed philosophically," he said, "he has come to respect Nedzi's ability in pressing his case."

HENDERSONVILLE, N.C.

TIMES-NEWS

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AUG 2 1971

A Conflict Of National Interest

Although we usually view the political and social scene from a different viewpoint, we find ourselves in accord with Columnist Marianne Means in the belief that 110 people are a lot of individuals to keep a secret.

We believe a lot of others would agree--especially if it were explained that the 110 were all members of congress.

The reference is to the Columnist's piece on the proposal that the Central Intelligence Agency be required to give routine briefings of its activities to the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees of the House and Senate.

The proposal has been made by the Hon. Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, fourth ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee whose chairman is the Hon. J. William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas.

At the present time the CIA is required to give such reports only to five subcommittees of the two houses, these including only the senior members of the four standing committees.

Quite naturally the heads of CIA (to say nothing of the boys down in the field) are quaking in their boots at the thought of 110 members of congress being made privy to their activities and this is not strange for if there was one fact on which there was any general agreement in the recent Pentagon Papers hassle it was that Washington, D.C., was about the loosest place in the world when considered from the secrecy-security viewpoint.

One can easily imagine the confusion that would exist as 110 members of congress rushed from the multi-exits of the State Department to the taxi stations in an effort to be the first to hold a press conference after receiving something hot like the CIA employment of the Indochina mountain people to locate Chinese launch sites.

We would venture the guess that CIA might as well close up shop if required to give an accounting of its activities to

110 members of congress, considering also the fact that most of them would have a husband and - or wife.

CIA not only has the difficult problem of furnishing information and intelligence to the President, but it frequently appears that it faces the task of justifying its existence and activities to a large portion of the 435 members of congress. It is rather difficult to accomplish such a mission when such activities are supposed to be known only within the organization.

To its other difficulties, Central Intelligence has the problem of recruiting personnel--commonly known as agents--and this is about as difficult as recruiting for the famous 82nd Airborne, even when the advertisement promises a five-day week, no k.p., and short orders in the mess halls at all hours, including a dish of foam.

Perhaps we have seen too much of Mission Impossible and the electric wizardry of Barney and Jim, but the avid followers of this series should remember that the "Secretary will deny any knowledge" if any of the team gets caught with a hand in the cookie jar.

This is the sort of decision which members of congress are required to make--and incidentally for which they are paid \$47,500 per annum, plus fringe benefits. We have become big boys now and face the necessity of making disagreeable decisions, of which this kind of business is one.

The member of congress is responsible for the actions of the government. Equally as important, he or she is responsible for the disbursement of public funds. To this is added the responsibility for national defense, including methods.

The natural conflict ought to be apparent to all, just as is the conflict within the mind of the President. Consequently we find it necessary to ask ourselves if the system can operate, but, if the answer is no, what can do better?

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"Why Not?

Sen. John Sherman Cooper, long known and admired for his good common sense, has offered a good common-sense proposal to the Congress, namely, that the National Security Act of 1947 be amended to require the Central Intelligence Agency to keep the "germane" committees of the Congress "fully and currently" informed by means of "analyses in regular and special reports" incorporating the intelligence gathered by that agency.

The argument for the proposal is clear enough: Congress is entitled to the same information that the executive receives in order to pass considered judgments on matters pertaining to its responsibilities. And why not? Surprisingly, the existing legislation does not specifically bar dissemination of CIA-gathered intelligence to Congress, but neither does it require that Congress be informed. So, by a familiar bureaucratic process, the practice developed of using this intelligence to brief the executive, leaving Congress out in the cold to scrounge around and get what intelligence it could. This is one of the principal causes of the exclusion of the Congress from deciding on when to start wars and when to end them. Of course it retains the power of the purse, but few members of either House are courageous enough to stop a war by withholding funds—it leaves them open to the accusation that they are letting down "our boys," which can prove fatal at election time.

Under the Cooper amendment, CIA information would have limited Congressional circulation. It would be made available to the Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, whose members could pass along pertinent portions to other legislators and staff members working on national security matters, subject to the normal security requirements.

Note, in contrast, how the CIA reports are used under the present arrangement. The President, for his purposes, leaks a CIA report to, say, *The New York Times* or, say, the POW proposals of the North Vietnamese Government. Does the President call in the reporters and tell them candidly that here is a "A report of general interest which I am divulging to all of you? He does nothing of the kind—he would rather play the leaking game. That is one reason why the executive prefers to hoard the information and withhold it from the Congress: he wants to be able to leak it when it serves his purpose to do so.

The damaging effects of this system are obvious. The Congress and the public are denied information on which vital decisions are based. The denial applies not only to military information but substantially to all data except what the executive chooses to share, which is always what will benefit him politically by enhancing his image and making him look, if not infallible, at least pretty close to it. The effect is to multiply errors as well as to hide them. The executive lacks the benefit of valuable feedback from the public and the press.

Senator Cooper has taken an important first step to limit the secrecy factor which bedevils our foreign relations. His remedy would broaden support for foreign policy and save us from involvement in another Indochina mess.

STATOTHR

The Nation

Congress:
For the
President
Some Ties
That Bind

I slept sounder than ever I remember to have done in my life . . . when I awakened. . . . I attempted to rise, but was not able to stir; for, as I happened to lie on my back, I found my arms and legs were strongly fastened on each side to the ground.

—From a Voyage to Lilliput in "Gulliver's Travels"

WASHINGTON — With a maze of legislative strings, the Congress last week dramatically accelerated efforts to ensnare a latter-day Gulliver named Richard Nixon. Those leading the attack, however, had an even larger target in mind: the ever-increasing power of the institution of the Presidency itself.

Thus, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee threatened to cut off funds for the military aid program unless the Executive Branch produced a Pentagon document. Committee rooms rang with complaints of excessive secrecy by the Executive Branch and proposals to force the Administration to supply Congress with information. And a bill to limit the warmaking powers of the Presidency began moving with unexpected speed and support through the legislative machinery.

Through all the noise and activity, which seemed to be ignored but was certainly not unheard by the Gulliver in the White House, ran a deep constitutional power struggle between the Presidency and the Congress. Ever since the Nixon Administration took office, and even before, in the closing days of the Johnson Administration, a Senate frustrated at not being included in foreign policy decisions and at being excluded from policy information in an assertive mood, seeking

to re-establish itself and Congress as a whole as a branch of the Government co-equal with the Presidency.

The most direct challenge last week — and one that could produce a stormy confrontation — came from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which discovered a little-noticed provision in the 1961 Foreign Aid Act. Basically the provision states that a foreign aid program will be cut off if, within 35 days, the Executive Branch has not supplied a foreign aid document requested by a Congressional committee — or, alternatively, if the President has not invoked Executive privilege to keep the document from Congress.

By a unanimous vote the committee decided to invoke the provision to require the Defense Department to turn over a five-year military assistance plan which it has refused to supply to the committee. In perhaps the clearest test of the Executive Branch's right to withhold information since the Eisenhower Administration tussled with Senator Joseph McCarthy, the Pentagon was thus faced with a choice of turning over the document or facing a suspension of its billion dollar military aid program to more than 40 nations.

The President could invoke Executive privilege, but that would set a precedent and undercut all the lesser reasons that the Executive Branch has been using for withholding information from Congress — that it would not be in the national interest to release such information or that the data were merely "internal working documents."

A Senate Judiciary subcommittee, meanwhile, began hearings on legislation, offered by Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that would compel Government officials to appear before Congressional committees and testify unless the President invoked Executive privilege. "When the Government operates in secrecy, its citizens are not doubtless the most important informed and their ignorance strong, therefore, was one that breeds oppression," said Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, one of the subcommittee chairman, at the outset of the hearings, and powers.

that pretty well summed up the frustration in the Senate over Executive Branch secrecy.

In a less punitive manner, Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky came forward with a proposal that Congressional committees, like the Executive Branch, should be furnished with information by the Central Intelligence Agency, again on the premise that if Congress is to help set foreign policy then it must be informed. Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey and Stuart Symington of Missouri, meanwhile, were pressing amendments that would prevent the President from using undisclosed C.I.A. funds to fight a secret war in Laos.

On the theory that the Senate should give advice as well as consent, Senator Vance Hartke advanced with a double-barreled resolution. One part would call for Senate confirmation of the new United States representative to the Vietnam peace talks in Paris. The other would offer the advice of the Senate that in the negotiations the United States should agree to a total troop withdrawal in nine months if agreement was reached on timely release of American prisoners of war.

The latter part was a variation on the Senate-approved troop withdrawal amendment of Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, that was still tying up legislation extending the draft. On Friday, House and Senate conferees reached agreement on a compromise that would considerably weaken the force of the Mansfield amendment but would retain the concept that the President should withdraw all troops by a "date certain" subject to the release of American P.O.W.'s.

All these various legislative strings, even if they should be tied down, would not fundamentally change the balance of power. At most they might make the Congress better informed in giving advice and thus more able to serve as a counterbalance to the Presidency. Uninformed and their ignorance strong, therefore, was one that breeds oppression," said Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, one of the subcommittee chairman, at the outset of the hearings, and powers.

In testimony last week be-

fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Professor Alexander M. Bickel of Yale Law School said: "In matters of war and peace, a succession of Presidents — well intentioned and patriotic, to be sure — have indeed come close to canceling the effectiveness of Congress. The result is a dangerous contradiction of the principles of democratic government, which I believe ought to be set right."

They were welcome, well-heeded words to members of the Foreign Relations Committee as they set about last week to consider legislation defining and restricting the war powers of the Presidency. What is expected to emerge is an amalgam of proposals offered by such unlikely partners in a challenge to

the Presidency as conservative Senator John Stennis of Mississippi and liberal Jacob K. Javits of New York. Basically their proposal is that the President could undertake emergency military actions, such as repelling an attack on United States forces, but could not continue military hostilities for more than a month without obtaining Congressional consent.

Even Senator Hugh Scott, who as Republican leader has stood as the Administration's spokesman against Congressional intrusions on Presidential prerogatives, joined in the drive for war powers legislation. "The time has come," he said, "when Congress will not be denied the right to participate, in accordance with the Constitution, in the whole enormous business of how wars are begun." Earlier in the month, Representative Gerald R. Ford, who as House Republican leader has been a conservative champion of the Administration, had endorsed war powers legislation. When the Republican leaders start talking that way it was proof that Congressional resentment and frustration over the secrecy and powers assumed by the White House were running deep.

Even the long passive House Foreign Affairs Committee was getting into the act. It included in the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill amendments that would aid to Greece until constitutional democracy is restored in that

MARIANNE EVANS

Congress Wants CIA Briefings

✓ CIA officials are very concerned about a new Senate move to require their secretive agency to give detailed global intelligence to congressional committees on a regular basis.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled hearings this September on a controversial measure that would greatly expand the number of senators who have access to classified CIA evaluations and information.

✓ The bill, proposed by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., would require the CIA to brief the full Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on a routine schedule, similar to the system under which the agency briefs top foreign policy officials of the executive branch.

ALARMED CIA OFFICIALS view the proposal as potentially jeopardizing their clandestine operations around the world. There are 119 congressmen on those four committees, and that's a lot of people to keep a secret. Consequently the CIA's three congressional liaison agents are trying quietly to have the measure killed.

The Senate however, is in a mood to expand its influence over Presidential foreign policy-making, and better intelligence is a vital tool toward that goal. The measure already has considerable supporters, including Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, and Sen. Stuart Symington, the only senator on both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

✓ The CIA now reports only to five special subcommittees of the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Those groups are concerned primarily with the CIA budget and operations. The CIA does not regularly brief Fulbright

or other congressmen whose major interest is in the field of foreign policy.

SENATE LEADERS COMPLAIN that they are asked to authorize and fund Presidential decisions that may result in U.S. soldiers going into combat but are told little more than the general public about the information and analyses that prompted those decisions. Cooper, a long-time opponent of the war in Vietnam, introduced the bill in the wake of the Pentagon Papers. He was angry to discover from the papers that the CIA had warned President Johnson full-scale bombing of North Vietnam might not frighten Hanoi into giving up.

CIA officials fear that congressmen privy to intelligence secrets will not be able to resist the temptation of leaking — and perhaps misinterpreting — snatches of information that serve their own political purposes or can get them publicity. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular has long had a reputation for being a sieve.

But congressmen retort, justifiably, they are no worse at keeping secrets than the White House itself. It is common practice for White House and State Department officials to leak classified documents and secret foreign intelligence when it suits their purpose. For instance, the administration recently surfaced intelligence warnings of new Soviet missile sites to help generate support for military budget items.

Even so, the administration keeps reasonably tight control over the number of officials who have access to CIA intelligence and who have permission to leak selected secrets at the appropriate moments. Congress has no such control over its members, and the odds that an individual congressman might make a grievous error in judgment about what is safe to make public are not inconsiderable.

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A Little More Candor With Congress Wouldn't Hurt the National Security.

BY ERNEST CONINE

No doubt Richard Nixon's instinct, like that of any President faced with the same situation, is to resist the growing demands that "his" CIA be required to give Congress the same kind of intelligence reports and estimates that it gives him.

Just one secrets-spilling blabbermouth on Capitol Hill could do incalculable harm to the national interest. Besides, presidential prerogatives are involved.

The thought occurs, however, that the Administration might be better advised to recognize that frustrated senators and congressmen have a point.

Congressmen Can't Vote Intelligently If the Facts Are Kept Secret

How can they be expected to vote intelligently and responsibly on presidential proposals in the fields of foreign policy and national security unless they have reasonable access to the intelligence on which these proposals are based?

How can they know whether an appropriation for a new ABM site or for more Pershing missiles is really needed unless they—or colleagues whom they trust—know something of what the Executive Branch knows of Soviet missile deployment?

The answer is that they can't.

It should be understood, of course, that the CIA is exposed to congressional scrutiny of a sort now.

Just about any House or Senate committee, can, upon request, obtain a closed-door briefing from CIA Director Richard Helms and other top officials of the agency.

The CIA's supersecret budget is reviewed in both houses by special panels drawn from the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. Since 1967 certain members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also have been invited to sit in on these watchdog sessions.

There has always been a certain dissatisfaction with this setup, and this dissatisfaction is growing.

In the first place, the CIA briefings are given not as a matter of congressional right but of presidential courtesy. Many disgruntled lawmakers are convinced, in any event,

that these sessions should be more frequent, more thorough—and the results made more readily available to congressmen and senators who are not members of the select panels.

Take the situation of Sens. Alan Cranston and John Tunney. They represent 20 million Californians who obviously have a stake in issues involving war and peace, and the setting of a proper scale of national priorities.

Neither, however, sits on any of the committees which deal with foreign policy and national security. When the time comes to vote on something like military appropriations or sense-of-Congress resolutions about Vietnam, they have no direct access to pertinent classified information.

Instead, as a practical matter, they must either accept or ignore the word of colleagues whose committees deal with foreign policy and national security questions on a regular basis.

And, except for the foreign relations committees, these are pretty well stacked with people who believe in a strong defense establishment—and are, therefore, not inclined to pass along intelligence which might support a contrary viewpoint.

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) has introduced a bill which would require the CIA, as a matter of law, rather than of presidential discretion, to supply "Congress, through its appropriate committees, the same intelligence conclusions, facts and analyses that are now available to the Executive Branch."

These intelligence materials, in turn, would be made available to any member of Congress who asks for them.

The trouble is, of course, that a secret which is made available to upwards of a thousand people (including staff employes) will not remain a secret very long. Certainly not when these people are in the profession of politics, and certainly not when a lot of them, like Sen. Mike Gravel of Alaska, might feel morally obligated to decide for themselves what should be released.

The best solution, one suspects, is a change which would broaden the kinds of people on Capitol Hill with access to CIA intelligence, without greatly increasing their numbers.

In that context, former Vice President Hubert Humphrey has come up with an attractive alternative.

STATOTHR

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W. PALM BEACH, FLA.

TIMES JUL 24 1972

E - 23,270

POST-TIMES

S - 69,302

Legislation Needed

New legislative safeguards offer the only hope for putting reins on the secret wars and intrigues foisted on U.S. citizens under the guise of "national defense" and "public interest."

Pending in the Senate are three bills to put strings on the super-secret funds and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Kentucky Republican Sen. John Sherman Cooper proposed a bill which would require the CIA to make available to Congress the "same intelligence conclusions, facts and analyses that are now available to the executive branch."

Another Republican, Sen. Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, authored a bill limiting commitment of troops, funds and military equipment to Laos and other areas. Sen. Case said he sees the need "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

The third bill, introduced by Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.), would require an accounting of CIA funds and prohibit concealment of the spy agency funds in appropriations for other agencies.

Future of the three Senate bills can only be guessed. But in the House, five resolutions on similar issues went down the drain in rapid-fire order. One was authored by Rep. Paul N. McCloskey (R-Calif.) who argued that the Congress has a right to be told "the entire truth" about Laotian operations. In contrast, the Foreign Affairs Committee argued that telling the truth about Laos "would not be compatible with the public interest" and the resolution was defeated on the floor of the House along with three similar resolutions.

Admittedly, some phases of government operation directly related to national defense appropriately belong in highly restricted classifications. The Laotian situation, however, and concealment of accurate figures on CIA funding illustrate the deliberately deceptive techniques frustrating efforts to learn the extent of U.S. entanglements in Indochina.

It is a cliché — and a none-too-accurate one — to observe that survival of a democracy depends on an informed electorate. Certainly, survival demands an informed Congress. The pending Senate bills — and perhaps more — are clearly called for and merit wide support.

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BUFFALO, N.Y.
NEWS

E - 281,982

JUL 20 1971

Let CIA Brief Congress, Too!

Senator Cooper (R., Ky.), in proposing that the Central Intelligence Agency supply Congress as well as the administration with its basic intelligence briefings, is seeking to apply one of the most glaring lessons of the Pentagon Papers. For they show that, time and again, the "intelligence community" — CIA and the other intelligence gathering agencies — was ignored or overruled when it gave a more pessimistic estimate than the top policymakers wanted to hear.

So if we are ever to get Congress back into the advice-and-consent act as an effective check on the abuse of executive powers in the war-making area, Sen. Cooper's call for a sharing of the basic intelligence estimates sounds like an obvious starting point.

This need not, of course, involve any blanket public disclosures of sensitive material, and certainly should not compromise intelligence sources or techniques. What is needed rather is the supplying to key congressional leaders and committees of the end product of the CIA's labors — the kind of intelligence briefings it has supplied to the opposing presidential candidates in all recent campaigns. Given proper security clearances, there should be no greater danger of damaging leaks than there is now from the scores of military and civilian officials who are privy to such data within the executive establishment.

The importance of the proposal is that it would give the congressional military and foreign-policy committees a far better basis than they have now for scrutinizing and debating developing policies before we are committed beyond recall. During every crucial stage of the Vietnam escalation, the Pentagon Papers show the intelligence community giving highly realistic estimates of the consequences of a given line of action —

which were borne out by events after their warnings were ignored. These involved not only such purely military matters as proposed increases in bombing or troop strength, but the raising of our stakes on the "domino theory" that all of Southeast Asia would likely fall if Vietnam did.

The CIA and its sister intelligence agencies are shown to have taken a uniformly dim view of the domino theory during the Kennedy and Johnson periods. And, according to one leaked report, the CIA advised the Nixon administration in 1969 that if the U. S. withdrew immediately from Vietnam all of Southeast Asia would remain just about "as it is for at least another generation." But if this was really the kind of intelligence reading Mr. Nixon got in 1969, he had obviously dismissed or overruled it when he said in a mid-1970 interview that "those who say the domino theory is obsolete . . . haven't talked to the dominoes."

Our point is that such fundamental advice as this, however it may be regarded by those ultimately responsible for policy, should be available to both of the branches of the Government that share in that ultimate responsibility — the Congress as well as the White House. If the Vietnam experience tells us anything, it is that Clemenceau was only half right when he said a half century ago that "war is too serious a business to leave to the generals." It is also too serious to trust only to the President and his coterie of top advisers. The responsibility must somehow be broadened to include an effective revitalization of the congressional check-and-balance function. And one of the best places to begin doing that is to make sure that the leaders of Congress have access to the same basic intelligence reading that the administration does.

LOUISVILLE, KY.
COURIER JOURNAL
JUL 8 1971
M - 239,949
S - 350,303

"We need information!"

Cooper offers bill seeking CIA data

By WARD SINCLAIR
Courier-Journal & Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—In another move aimed at reasserting congressional authority, Sen. John Sherman Cooper introduced legislation yesterday that would require the executive branch to regularly share its intelligence reports with Congress.

Cooper's bill, amending the National Security Act of 1947, calls on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to "fully and currently" keep appropriate congressional committees apprised of security matters.

The Kentucky Republican said he had planned to introduce such a measure last year, but that it was sidetracked by other activities of the Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is a member. He acknowledged, however, that new motivation came from the ongoing debate over newspaper publication of the so-called Pentagon papers, the extensive classified study of the roots of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Wants Congress to have all information

Cooper said his intention is to help provide Congress with sufficient and adequate background intelligence information—the same data available to the executive—for making decisions in the foreign policy field.

"We in Congress are called upon to support these activities with men and money; there is the possibility of engaging in commitments with other nations that could lead to combat—this has been the source of confrontation between the executive and the legislative," he said.

"I hope this amendment can lead to more harmonious relations between the two branches of government," he added.

The Kentucky senator said he felt that recent disclosure of the Pentagon papers showed "we didn't get the information" needed to assist Congress in determining its support of successive administrations in prosecuting the Vietnam involvement.

Cooper said he had not notified the White House in advance of his action yesterday. He speculated that the Nixon administration might resist his proposal, but he feels it will have considerable support in Congress.

Informing Congress not forgotten

"I think the prospects for passage are good," he said. "It would have an effect on the increased declassification of documents... it would be along the lines of establishing the standards the Supreme Court referred to" in its decision last week that allowed newspapers to resume publication of the Pentagon papers.

Cooper said the 1947 security act did not prohibit the CIA from giving Congress the same intelligence data that it provides the executive branch. But, he added, it did not specifically call for such action, either.

"Oh, we have gone to the CIA and had briefings and the CIA has been helpful, but it is not a matter of how that they must provide the information to Congress," he said.

His amendment, he said, would require the CIA to keep the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees and their counterparts in the House regularly briefed on security matters.

Cooper said the intelligence apparatus of the government on occasion has appeared before these committees upon request, but he said there were other times when such had not been the case.

"I am aware of when we on the Foreign Relations Committee asked for information from both Presidents—Johnson and Nixon—and it didn't come or it came too late," he noted.

He also mentioned that the Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., had tried without success some time ago to get the administration to turn over the Pentagon papers.

Cooper's action yesterday was another in a series he has spearheaded during the past several years in an attempt to reassert the constitutional role of Congress in sharing foreign policy decisions with the executive branch.

These efforts have included the Cooper-Church amendment on Cambodia, the national-commitments resolution and a sense-of-the-Senate resolution limiting the presidential field of military action in Laos and Thailand.

TR FOR FOLO

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HOUSTON, TEX.

CHRONICLE

JUN 1 3 1970
E - 279,608
S - 333,807

Watchdog Panel Plan Challenged in Senate

BY MILES BENSON

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Washington—When the Senate barred its doors Monday and sat down to hear details of how the United States was financing mercenary Thai troops fighting in Laos, it was the first most senators had heard about the operation.

But a privileged handful apparently had known all about it for more than a year. They just never had told their colleagues.

This incenses Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., who feels his colleagues keep too many "major policy" secrets from each other—and from the public.

Watchdog Panel

The "insiders" were members of a little-known subcommittee set up in 1955 to act as a watchdog over activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The committee has met only three times in the last two years. It is the CIA that has been financing 4800 Thai mercenaries—the State Department calls them "volunteers"—in violation of a 1970 congressional ban, critics contend.

The secrecy surrounding the operation was defended by Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., who argues that if all the other senators knew of it, it would not have been a secret.

But Case insists such a major policy move should be public business.

Burying Information

Case challenges the usefulness of the CIA committee, saying that it "serves as a means for burying information rather than bringing it out into the open."

And it's not just the CIA committee, Case contends, that is guilty of such "institutionalized secrecy." Another special panel operating the same way, he charges, is the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

"Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., for instance, never knew anything about the location of missiles around the world until he got on that committee, and he was startled by the information he got," Case declared.

The AEC committee is given access to classified information on the location and power of nuclear warheads the United States keeps at the ready around the world.

"The point is that information on major policy ought to be public information," Case said. "And the public's participation in these matters, through their representatives in Congress, is the real goal we are seeking."

Prior to the closed Senate session on Laos, Case doubted that even the CIA oversight committee had been informed of the mercenary operations.

Case's criticism of the CIA and AEC committees is countered by Jackson, who serves on both panels. He says they work so well that he wants another one set up to oversee the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a proposal he has been quietly pushing.

"These committees were set up on the theory that certain sensitive things should be on a 'need-to-know' basis," he said. "If you let everybody know, there is no longer a secret."

Asked if the CIA committee had been informed of the CIA support for Thai mercenaries in Laos, Jackson replied: "Yes, we were told. They have kept us currently informed."

The CIA oversight subcommittee, chaired by Sen. John Stennis, D-Miss., who also heads the parent Senate Armed Service Committee, has yet to meet this year. It last met March 20, 1970. It also sat Jan. 30, 1970. In 1969 it met only once, on Feb. 21. At each of the three meetings, the only witness was CIA Director Richard Helms. The committee met twice in 1968 and five times in 1967.

Besides Stennis and Jackson, other members of the committee are Symington, Peter H. Dominick, R-Colo., and Barry M. Goldwater, R-Ariz.

KANSAS CITY, MO.

STAR

E - 325,351

S - 396,682

400 101871

Case Critical of Secrecy Inside Senate Committees

Newhouse News Service

Washington—When the Senate barred its doors Monday and sat down to hear details of how the United States was financing mercenary Thai troops fighting in Laos, it was the first time most of the members had heard about the operation.

But a privileged handful on the Senate floor apparently had known all about it for more than a year. They just never had told their colleagues.

This incenses Sen. Clifford P. Case (D-N.J.), who feels his colleagues keep too many "major policy" secrets from each other—and from the public.

The "insiders" Monday were members of a little-known subcommittee set up in 1955 to act as a watchdog over activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The committee has met only three times in the last 2 years. It is the CIA that has been financing 4,800 Thai mercenaries—the State Department calls them "volunteers"—in violation of a 1970 congressional ban, critics contend.

The secrecy surrounding the operation was defended by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.),

who argues that if all the other senators knew of it, it would not have been a secret.

But Case insists such a major policy move should be public business.

Case challenged the usefulness of the CIA committee, saying in an interview that it "serves as a means for burying information rather than bringing it out into the open."

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"The point is that information on major policy ought to be

public information," Case said. "And the public's participation in these matters, through their representatives in Congress, is the real goal we are seeking."

Prior to the closed-door Senate session on Laos, Case doubted that even the overseeing committee on the CIA had been informed of the mercenary operations.

"People, when they are given information in confidence," he said, "are very reluctant to even admit they've got any information."

Although the dispute continues over the legality of the CIA role in Laos, secrecy about the operation has been largely discarded. The State Department has confirmed that the United States is paying Lao and Thais, from northeast Thailand to cross the border and fight under Laotian command in Laos.

Case's criticism of the CIA and AEC committees is countered by Jackson, who serves on both panels. He says they work so well that he wants another, one set up to oversee the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a proposal he has been quietly pushing in recent weeks.

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Senate Sets Secret Session Today For Report On Laos

Washington, June 6 (AP)—The Senate meets tomorrow behind locked doors to receive a secret report on a multimillion-dollar clandestine United States operation in Laos. Some senators contend it has deepened American involvement in Southeast Asia and violates congressional restrictions.

On the eve of the senators' only session, the Nixon administration said the efforts in behalf of the Laotian government are directly related to American troop withdrawals from South Vietnam. This justification came in a letter from a State Department official to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.).

"Wholesale Evasion"
Mr. Kennedy today called it inadequate and contradictory and said the administration has been guilty of "a wholesale evasion of responsible discussion over U.S. military activities in northern Laos."

The secret session, the second on Southeast Asia in two years, was requested by Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) to discuss a still-secret report by two staff members from the Foreign Relations Committee who visited Laos in April.

Committee members said after a briefing on the report that it details how the CIA underwrites 4,800 Thai troops in Laos and shows that the administration has given the committee incomplete and at times inaccurate data on the Laotian situation.

Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the majority leader, told reporters that Mr. Symington may seek a dollar limit on U.S. actions in Laos and said the session "gives the whole Senate

a chance to comprehend what has happened there."

"This session is being requested in light of the increasingly grave situation in that country, along with the implications of that situation for the United States," Senator Symington said in a statement today.

He added, "Our activities in Laos have been carried out largely in secret, without congressional sanction and outside the normal appropriations process."

Although the only publicly announced U.S. program in Laos spends \$52 million on economic aid, Mr. Symington said, "the cost of United States-supported military operations runs the amount we are actually spending well into the hundreds of million of dollars."

He said that, based on the report of James G. Lowenstein and Richard Moose, he will tell the Senate about B-52 bombing raids in northern Laos; U.S. financial support of the Royal Lao Army, irregular Lao forces and Thai troops, "and the increasing Chinese presence in Laos."

"I will describe what the United States is now doing in Laos; and under what legal authority, or in possible violations of what legislative restrictions, these activities are being carried out; and at what cost to the United States," he said.

Congress last year prohibited

U.S. funds for foreign forces to support the governments of Laos and Cambodia but made an exception for actions that would aid U.S. troop withdrawals or the release of American prisoners.

The relation between the activities in Laos and U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam was cited in a letter from David M. Abshire, assistant secretary of state for congressional relations, to Senator Kennedy, who had asked the administration April 23 about the authority for the Laotian operations.

"If the North Vietnamese were to conquer all of Laos they could divert thousands of their forces now engaged in north Laos to the war against South Vietnam, and greatly enhance their position in those areas of Laos bordering on South Vietnam from which they launch attacks on United States and allied forces," Mr. Abshire wrote.

Noting President Nixon's policy of withdrawing U.S. forces, he said, "The President's constitutional powers as commander in chief and in the field of foreign relations provide authority for him to take reasonable measures to carry out these withdrawals, to protect our troops and to bring the hostilities which were under way when he took office to an end in a way that will contribute to a durable peace."


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TRIBUNE
MAY 22 1971M - 767,793
S - 1,016,275Capitol Views

U. S. Faces Nuclear Peril or Surrender

BY WILLARD EDWARDS

WASHINGTON, May 21—After secret hearings, one of the most prestigious congressional committees, traditionally averse to alarmism, has reached this ominous conclusion:



Edwards

Never before, perhaps, has the warning of an impending national crisis been couched in terms so blunt and uncompromising.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which voiced it, is an unusual combination of nine senators and nine representatives, created to exercise legislative control in all matters affecting development of the most terrifying force known to man.

Perhaps because this jurisdiction is so sobering, the committee is customarily nonpolitical and bipartisan. It has 10 Democratic and 8 Republican members, some hawks, some doves, some conservative, some liberal. It conducts most hearings in secret and usually avoids publicity.

Its findings assumed added significance in view of yesterday's announcement by Moscow and Washington of an apparent breakthru in arms control talks, hinting at Russia's motive for agreeing, after 18 months of stalling, to discuss a curb on offensive as well as defensive weapons.

THE REPORT WAS BASED mainly on the closed-door testimony of Vice Adm. H. G. Rickover on the status of the naval nuclear propulsion program which he developed and directs.

But the 278-page volume also contains hitherto unpublished official reports and statements by other experts. The committee mentioned that it had received a briefing by CIA Director Richard Helms on the activities of Soviet naval forces in all the oceans of the world.

All this evidence, even the heavily censored to delete classified information, furnished a dismaying portrayal of rapidly increasing Communist sea power coincident with a deteriorating American Navy.

The bald facts: Russia's total surface fleet of 2,009 units compares with a U. S. surface fleet of 563 units. Its total submarine strength, 355; the United States, 142. The advantage in nuclear submarines in which we long took comfort has disappeared.

Soviet ballistic missile submarines now patrol off both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts in easy range of 95 per cent of America's urban industrial areas.

NOTING THAT RUSSIA also has passed the U. S. in the field of long range ballistic missiles, the committee concluded that unless prompt measures are taken to build up a nuclear Navy, the U. S. will have "to give in on all issues. . . . There may be no future. . . . We will soon find ourselves unable to defend our national interests."

Strong words, these, but they were drowned out in the congressional clamor over other issues. To Rickover, it was an old story, this placidity in the face of what he regards as a genuine peril. He recalled that some newspapers criticized him as "inflammatory" a year ago when he predicted that Russia would go ahead of the U. S. in nuclear submarines. That forecast has been proved correct and Russia's submarine production rate [15 a year] will soon put it far in the lead.

The committee noted that the public is tired of war and averse to increased military spending. But it urged recollection of the statement by President Eisenhower quoted on the keel of the nuclear aircraft carrier which bears his name:

"Until war is eliminated from international relations, unpreparedness for it is well nigh as criminal as war itself."

Case Says U.S. Secretly Pays Costs of Thai Troops in Laos

STATOTHR

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States is secretly paying "through CIA" for the costs of "four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos" without any direct action by Congress, Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) said yesterday.

Case called on the administration for "the specific terms of the agreement," which he said he first read about in the press last month. "Congress has never directly voted a penny to pay Thai troops in Laos," said Case, and both Congress and the public have "a right to know" what is happening.

Thailand has denied having any troops in Laos; its officials

have said only that there may be Thai "volunteers" or "ethnic Thais" serving in Laos. U.S. officials have been publicly silent on the subject, except to refer back to the elliptical Thai statements.

Case finally got a reply yesterday to a letter he sent on April 23 to the State Department—but he said the reply was marked secret.

The substance of the reply to Case, according to State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray, was that "nothing is being done that is not within present legislative authority." Bray said the subject had been discussed in closed session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which Case is a member, and State could discuss the matter further only in the same manner.

Case said last night that "I'm still not satisfied . . . We should have been advised before the thing started, rather than having it dribble out afterwards in a way in which we can do little more than wring our hands."

The senator said that as he recalls, the subject of Thai units in Laos was only "touched on" by Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms, in a closed meeting.

After reading press accounts last month about a new U.S.-Thai agreement "for a sharp increase in Thai troops to be used in Laos," said Case, he made his own inquiries.

"I was able to ascertain," said Case, "on an absolutely not for quotation basis, from government sources that there

are four to six thousand Thai troops in Laos and the U.S. government, through CIA, is paying for them."

Case said that "If an action by our country cannot stand up to public exposure, then our leaders should seriously reconsider that action."

His letter to Secretary of State William P. Rogers asked if financial support for Thai troops in Laos violated a congressional ban on payment of mercenaries in Laos except to aid American troop withdrawals or aid in release of U.S. prisoners; the terms of the Thai agreement, and whether the United States agreed to provide support "in event the Thai troops in Laos encounter difficulties."

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Politics Snagging Space Secrets

By Jack Anderson

Administration officials have been playing politics with some of the most sensitive secrets that come into the Pentagon—namely, the intelligence gleaned from our space photography.

The film packets are dropped from space over the Pacific and snagged out of the air by Air Force planes. The films then are analyzed by photo experts who can determine from the advance preparations that a hole in the ground is intended as a missile silo.

This satellite reconnaissance intelligence, known by the secret code name "Tango-Kilo," is sent to the Special Activities Office in the Pentagon. The intelligence is so tightly guarded that some of the Pentagon's own intelligence analysts can't get a T-K clearance.

In fact, Adm. John McCain, Pacific commander, complained last year that the severe security restrictions on T-K sightings are causing an intelligence gap. In a message marked for the eyes only of Adm. Thomas Moorer, the Joint Chiefs' chairman, McCain pleaded that the men who prepare our intelligence

posture need better access to T-K secrets to avoid misinterpretations.

Yet Defense Secretary Mel Laird and CIA Chief Richard Helms have been giving out selective T-K intelligence to favorite senators to win support for the defense budget.

They have warned, in closed-door briefings, that the Soviets are deploying new monster missiles. This is information straight out of the supersecret T-K files.

Satellite sightings showed that the Soviets stopped deploying their huge, multi-warhead SS-9 missiles at the 300 level, then started digging even bigger silos for the monster missiles. More than 40 huge holes have been dug, but the new missiles have neither been tested nor installed.

Meanwhile, selective T-K information, so secret it is sometimes withheld from our intelligence experts, can be leaked to the public, apparently, when it suits the Administration's purposes.

HHH Rates Rivals

Hubert Humphrey's secret political files contain some fascinating assessments of his Democratic presidential rivals.

He made the assessments in 1968 when he was choosing a running mate. At least two of the men he then considered are now trying to beat him out for the 1972 presidential nomination.

We have seen the confidential papers, which show how Humphrey rated Senators Ed Muskie and George McGovern in 1968. Humphrey boiled down the case for and against each man.

Evaluating Muskie, Humphrey summarized:

"Pro: A former governor, a respected senator, he is well liked and would appear qualified and fully experienced. His Polish-Catholic background could also be helpful. Poles, who are likely to be in the white backlash force, are concentrated in nine states, representing 196 electoral votes, ranging from Ohio where they are 1.5 per cent of the population to Connecticut where they are 4.7 per cent of the population (Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Ohio).

"Con: Does he show enough energy and other attributes of genuine leadership?"

Rating McGovern, Humphrey wrote:

"Pro: His peace identification and Kennedy relationship would attract some Kennedy supporters and heal some Vietnam political wounds.

"Con: He is unknown, does not communicate strength or leadership capacity."

Washington Whirl

DRUGS AT MYLAI? — There were rumors that some of the soldiers, who gunned

down women and children at My Lai, were high on drugs. A study of addiction in the Americal division, which was responsible for the My Lai massacre, was completed in September, 1970—13 months after the massacre. This made no attempt to show the relationship between the use of drugs and the killings. But it declared shockingly: "Drugs represent a real problem for a combat unit. Approximately five per cent of the division are in reality addicts." This contradicts the official Pentagon line that the drug problem hasn't affected combat.

NIXON AIDES DISABILITY—President Nixon was irritated over a press conference question last week about Lt. Jonathan Rose, who has been on loan to the White House for two years, thus avoiding active military duty. Rose happens to be the son of H. Chapman Rose, a Nixon friend and GOP fund raiser. The President explained that the lieutenant "has a physical disability, an injury to his shoulder, which disqualifies him from active combat duty." This disability, however, doesn't keep him from playing tennis and squash at the White House. When we asked young Rose about this, he explained that he has a dislocatable left shoulder. This, he said, doesn't interfere with his tennis and squash, which he plays with his right hand.

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The Big Lie

Soviet Style

This is the first in a series of four articles analyzing the Soviet Union's campaign to discredit the West and sow confusion with deception, fraud and forgeries.

By L. EDGAR PRINA
Military Affairs Editor
Copley News Service

WASHINGTON — At No. 2 Dzerzhinsky Square, not far from the Kremlin in downtown Moscow, there's a rather ugly gray limestone edifice whose notoriety has been recorded in novel and news story.

It is the infamous Lubianka Prison building, the end of the line for many an important "enemy" of Stalin and his successors, but in czarist days the home of the Lubianka Insurance Co.

Since the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Lubianka has also served as headquarters of the dread Soviet secret police, the Cheka, when it was first set up under Felix Dzerzhinsky.

Today the secret police organization is known as the KGB or, more formally, the Committee of State Security, and one of its busiest arms is Department D of its first chief directorate, popularly called the Department of "Dezinformatsiya" (disinformation).

A more apt name, according to U.S. intelligence experts, would be "Department of Dirty Tricks."

The key function performed by Department D, which was created in late 1959, is to help prepare, carry out and monitor deception/disinformation operations — an effort directed primarily against the United States ("Glavni Vrag" or "Enemy No. 1") and its allies. It has a headquarters payroll of perhaps 60 to 75 experts of various types. Its chief for a number of years was the recently deceased Gen. Ivan Ivanovich Agayants.

Vasily Sitnikov, an expert on North Atlantic Treaty Organization affairs, was No. 2 and may have been advanced to acting chief.

Underscoring the department's importance is the fact that one of the most powerful groups in the USSR, the

Central Committee of the Communist Party, directly supervises its work. The schemes and themes of disinformation are planned by the party leaders and committee staff units handle the details. If forgeries are required, they are prepared by Department D experts or satellite intelligence services, often the East German and Czech.

The aim of the game is not simply to mislead and defame the Western powers but, through such weapons as phony "facts," fraudulent documents and false reports, to prompt them to take actions contrary to their own interests.

Richard M. Helms, director of Central Intelligence, has pointed out that the Russians "have a long tradition in the art of forgery." They produced the spurious anti-Semitic tract, "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," at the turn of the century.

Soviet forgeries began appearing in volume in 1957 and many of them have been aimed at American targets through a worldwide network.

"The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) put these fakes under the microscope," Helms told the Senate Internal Security subcommittee when he was top aide to Allen W. Dulles at the agency. "We found that each Soviet forgery is manufactured and spread according to a plan. Each is devised and timed to mesh with other techniques of psychological warfare in support of Soviet strategy."

Helms listed three main purposes of the disinformation effort:

1. To discredit the West generally, and the United States and its government specifically, in the eyes of the rest of the world.

2. To sow "suspicion and discord" among the Western allies, especially between the United States and its friends.

3. To drive a wedge between the peoples of non-Soviet block countries and their governments by fostering the line that "these governments do not represent their citizens because they are puppets" of the United States.

The Soviets use a variety of types of documentary frauds, including the false news story, the distortion of a genuine document, the forgery, the fabrication of a document and the false or true account attributed to a non-existent organization.

According to Helms, a number of tricks are "used by the Soviets to nurse a little 'plant' into a big lie." He cited a few:

"One is to print a local or planted rumor as a news article using both (Soviet) bloc and free world papers as outlets. Another is to lend the tale a seeming authenticity by replaying through bloc media stories attributed to the Western press. A third device is the allegation that the current Soviet charges are proven by secret Western documents — documents that do not even exist as forgeries."

The major Soviet disinformation themes charge that the United States is an imperialist power bent upon world domination; that it interferes in the affairs of independent countries and that it connives against its own allies.

To promote these themes, the Soviets have peddled some fantastic concoctions.

Would you believe Nelson A. Rockefeller sent a "letter" to President Dwight D. Eisenhower outlining a cynical plan for using U. S. military and economic aid to press a world domination goal?

How about an "agreement" between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi of Japan "to permit use of Japanese troops anywhere in Asia?"

Or a "letter" from Dulles to the U.S. ambassador to Iran, in which the secretary made insulting remarks about the shah?

Perhaps a "letter" from Dr. Frank B. Berry, assistant secretary of defense for health, to Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy in 1958?

This one had Berry asserting that 67.3 per cent of all flight personnel in the U.S. Air Force were psychoneurotic, many showing phobias, "hysterical syndromes and fits of unaccountable animosity."

Berry also "reported" that studies of chronic overstrain of the nervous system among Strategic Air Command pilots and navigators indicated "excessive and systematic use of alcohol (quite often even in flight), use of narcotic drugs (particularly cigarettes containing opium and marijuana), and sexual excesses and perversions."

For good measure, this line was added: "Moral depression is a typical condition of all crew members making flights with atomic and H-bombs."

The forged Berry letter first surfaced in the East German newspaper Neues Deutschland in May, 1958, and then was replayed in other Communist organs.

Later Soviet disinformation projects pushed charges just as far out.

For example, a "letter" dated June 18, 1963, from Sargent Shriver, director of the Peace Corps, to the president of Ethiopia doctored with the

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WASHINGTON STAR

18 APR 1971

House, Senate Panels Plan Hearings on War

By TAD SEUIC

New York Times News Service

Hearings on American involvement in Indochina—emphasizing the moral and humanitarian aspects of the U.S. role in the war—are to be held concurrently in the Senate and the House this month.

The Senate subcommittee on refugees, headed by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass., plans to question top-level administration officials on civilian war casualties, refugees and physical destruction in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

The House subcommittee on foreign operations and freedom of information, headed by Rep. William S. Moorhead, D-Pa., is preparing to hold a "pre-audit" investigation of the U.S.-supported 1971 pacification plan in South Vietnam.

A "pre-audit" investigation is a congressional study of a gov-

ernment program while it is in progress.

The hearings will be separate from hearings on military and political policies in Indochina that the Senate and House foreign affairs committees also may call this month.

Congressional sources say Secretary of State William P. Rogers has declined to appear before the Kennedy subcommittee. Among witnesses slated to testify is William D. Colby, the head of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.

The Kennedy subcommittee plans to concentrate on the humanitarian problems of the war. Its earlier hearings and reports have emphasized the inadequacies of the programs for refugees and war victims.

The House subcommittee expects to study the new "community defense and local development" plan for pacification.

Radio Ex-Staffers to Testify

CIA Funds Hot Issue

STATOTHR

By JOHN P. WALLACH

News American

Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Former American staffers of Radio Free Europe (RFE) are prepared to testify in Congress that they had to sign an oath refusing to divulge multimillion dollar Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) bank-rolling of RFE on penalty of a maximum \$10,000 fine and 10-year prison sentence.

This and other disclosures, sources close to Sen. Clifford P. Case "cautioned today, could seriously embarrass the Nixon administration if it decides to take an uncooperative approach to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, scheduled to begin on April 23.

CASE HAS spearheaded a Senate drive to strip RFE of what he charged in a recent speech were subsidies of "several hundred million dollars" from "secret" CIA funds which, the New Jersey Republican contended, have for 20 years made up almost the entire RFE budget.

In an attempt to force RFE and Moscow-banning Radio Liberty (RL) to quit the pretense of acting as "private" organizations relying solely on voluntary contributions, Case introduced legislation in February to have both propaganda agencies funded through direct, acknowledged congressional appropriations.

Case has announced his intention to call to testify leading administration officials reportedly including Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and CIA Director Richard Helms.

THE ADMINISTRATION is examining a series of options ranging from fighting to maintain the status quo, which could turn the hearings into a parade of disclosures about the extent of CIA involvement, to congressional funding, in much the same manner as the Voice of America (VOA) is financed.

The most workable compromise now appears to be setting up a public corporation to run RFE. The corporation would be funded by Congress but would retain a semi-private character that would

allow the U. S. government, whenever convenient, to deny association with RFE policies.

Congressional sources stress that funding the corporation would not involve any new money since the government already is footing the bill. It would allow transferring the \$33 million annual subsidy from secret CIA coffers to the open, congressional appropriation process.

THE ADMINISTRATION review is considered so sensitive that the White House has ordered it take place in the supersecret "Forty Committee," also known as the "Covert Action Group."

Although chaired by National Security Council chief Dr. Henry Kissinger, the mechanism is used only when a subject is considered too hot to go to the President through regular SC channels.

The Chief Executive is known to have had personal ties to several of RFE's most prominent backers and to have strong feelings about RFE's importance in Europe.

Case's bill, which proposed amending the Information and Education Act to provide funds for RFE, has attracted bipartisan support from several senators, including Harold Hughes, D-Iowa, Jacob K. Javits, R-N. Y. and J. William Fulbright, D-Ark.

They are prepared to press the issue as an example of the loss of congressional control over U. S. foreign policy.

CASE WAS understood to be ready to call former RFE staffers to testify that the CIA regularly assigned agents to two-year tours of duty at RFE headquarters in Munich, and that they masqueraded as accredited news correspondents on information-gathering missions all over Eastern Europe.

Other American employees were sooner or later required to sign a paper making them privy to the CIA connection, sources close to Case disclosed.

The document, they said, informed the Americans that RFE was a "project" of the CIA that the undersigned has not been "officially" informed and that if he

divulges the information he becomes liable for the maximum punishment under Section 733 (D), Title 50, of the U. S. Code.

This section proscribes penalties up to \$10,000 and 10 years in prison, for the "communication of classified information by government officer or employee."

29 MAR 1971

Activities In Congress

Senate

Meets at 10 a.m.
Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee D.C.--10 a.m. Open 1221 New bldg.
Appropriations Subcommittee -- PB works; NW Engr. Div. and Delaware River basin--2 p.m. Open S 116 Capitol.
Post Office--Wage Board list; John F. Griner, Amer. Fed. of Civil Employees--10 a.m. Open G 203, Auditorium New bldg.
Welfare Subcommittees--AOA and W. H. Conference on Aging; Robert Jackson, North Caucus on Black Aging; Garrison Mayer, Pres., Task Force on the Aging--10 a.m. Open 2222 New bldg.
Appropriations Subcommittee -- DOD; Army--10 a.m. Closed S 116 Capitol.
Armed Forces Military Personnel, Navy Secy., Chairman, John C. S. Winter--10 a.m. Closed 213 Old bldg.
Foreign Relations Subcommittees--Strategic Nuclear Treaty, CIA Dir. Richard Helms, SALT, Phyllis Farley, ACDA--9:30 a.m. Closed S 116 Capitol.

Symington Paps Policy of Secrecy on Missiles

Protests He Was Put Under Wraps About Russ Developments but Colleague Wasn't

BY JOHN H. AVERILL

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) complained Wednesday that he was put under secrecy wraps by the Administration about Soviet missile developments only to learn that a colleague discussed them openly on a television program.

Although Symington mentioned no names, he appeared to suggest that the colleague, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), may have broken security rules.

Jackson, who was not on the Senate floor when Symington spoke, later denied that he breached security in having said the Russians are in the process of deploying a new generation of missiles. Jackson, appearing on the Sunday television program Face the Nation, called the developments "ominous indeed."

Admits Mistake

"Nothing that I said violated any rule of security," Jackson said. He added, however, that he made a mistake in speaking Sunday of "huge new missiles."

"There was a misunderstanding," Jackson said. "These are sites we are talking about. They are building sites that are as large or larger than the SS-9," the largest Soviet missile thus far deployed.

"These sites appear to be a follow-on to the SS-9," Jackson continued. "It takes about 18 months to build a site and we don't know what they mean except their dimensions are larger than those of sites for the SS-9."

Symington said he subsequently refused to discuss publicly what he had been told about Soviet missiles because of "the secrecy emphasis of the classified briefing." But he said Monday morning he saw a front page story with the headline, "Mighty Soviet Missile Reported."

Symington inserted a copy of the story, which was based on Jackson's Sunday television interview, in the Congressional Record. The first paragraph of the story said, "The Soviet Union is deploying huge advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles qualitatively mightier than its known weapons, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) said yesterday."

Jackson said he was not present at Helms' March 4 briefing of the Armed Services Committee, of which he also is a member. He declined to say where he got the information.

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Reads Statement

Symington complained about Administration secrecy over Soviet missile developments in a three-page statement which he read to the Senate. It was the second time in little more than a week that Symington has accused the Administration of excessive secrecy.

On March 1, he said White House adviser Henry A. Kissinger was the real formulator of Administration foreign policy, rather than Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Symington, at that time, said Kissinger refused to testify before Congress and that Rogers was a laughing stock and "secretary of state in title only." President Nixon later denounced those remarks as a "cheap shot."

Symington said Wednesday that the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which he is a member, was briefed about Soviet missile plans "in a session secret to the point where no record was kept." The March 4 briefing was conducted by Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Missile Details

"This briefing," Symington continued, "included for the first time purported details of new Soviet missiles which was not known about when the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was briefed the previous week on the same subject by the same people." The joint committee, of which Symington also is a member, was briefed by Helms Feb. 24.

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Symington Suggests Jackson Disclosed Classified Material

ON SOVIET

By JOEL W. FRIMAY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 10.

Senator Stuart Symington suggested today that Senator Henry M. Jackson had used classified information in staging on a nationwide television program that the Soviet Union was deploying an advanced intercontinental ballistic missile. The suggestion was immediately denied by Senator Jackson, who told reporters that "nothing I said violated any rules of security." In a television appearance last Sunday, the Washington Democrat said "the Russians are now in the

process of deploying a new generation, and advanced generation of offensive systems."

In a brief Senate speech, Senator Symington did not directly accuse Senator Jackson, a colleague on both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, of having violated security.

But he contended that the information on new Soviet missile developments had been presented on a highly classified basis to the Armed Services Committee on March 4 by the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms.

Later, after talking with Sen-

ator Jackson, Senator Symington said his speech was "not intended as criticism of Senator Jackson" over the intelligence information because the Administration "gave it to him to put out."

In complaining that "inaccurate intelligence reports" had been used in the past to justify unneeded weapons, Senator Symington, clearly alluding to the statements, made by Senator Jackson on the Columbia Broadcasting System program "Face the Nation," said:

"Last week, in a session secret to the point where no record was kept, the Senate Armed

Services Committee was briefed about Soviet missile plans. This briefing included for the first time purported details of new Soviet missiles which was not known about when the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was briefed the previous weeks on the same subject by the same people."

Mr. Helms appeared before the Atomic Energy Committee on Feb. 24 and the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 4 in his annual briefing of the committees on Soviet military posture.

Senator Jackson said he had not attended the March 4 briefing but declined to say where he had obtained his information about the Soviet missile developments except to say, "I try to keep currently informed on what is going on." He said he had decided to make public use of the information on the basis of his own judgment, based on years of experience, that it was not classified.

The Symington speech was the latest round in a controversy that has developed between the Administration and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--of which the Senator is a member--over the use of classified information.

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Senator Hints Jackson Leaked Secret

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

Sen. Stuart Symington has implied that classified information was divulged by Sen. Henry M. Jackson when Jackson said this week that the Soviet Union is preparing new offensive missiles bigger than any in the past.

The Nixon administration has given no sign of being upset about the "leak," but Symington is.

He suggested yesterday that administration officials planned the leak.

Jackson, a Washington Democrat, insists that "nothing I said violates any rules of secrecy." He would not say where he got his information. He explained simply, "I try to keep myself informed."

Other sources said that the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard C. Helms, briefed members of the Armed Services Committee about the detected missile sites at a secret session last Thursday.

Jackson was not present at that session, but since he is a senior and influential member of the committee, and one who maintains a close relationship with Helms, the information could have been made available to him.

Jackson appeared on CBS' "Face the Nation" on Sunday and told a national audience the Russians are deploying a new generation of missiles larger than their huge SS-9s.

The Pentagon quickly confirmed that some new construction of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile sites has been detected.

And United Press International reported that President Nixon

mentioned the development the same day when he initiated a telephone interview with White House Correspondent Helen Thomas.

On Tuesday, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird told Congress publicly that the Soviets had slowed the pace of their missile building, but he speculated that an explanation "may be that the Soviets are preparing to deploy new ICBM systems."

Symington, a Missouri Democrat, raised the leak issue yesterday in a brief speech on the Senate floor. Referring to the Helms briefing, he said that Soviet missile plans were discussed with the Armed Services Committee "last week in a session secret to the point that no record was kept."

He said that briefing "included for the first time purported details of new Soviet missilery which was not known about when the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was briefed the previous week on the same subject by the same people."

Symington said he was up about two points.

First, he said, he doesn't accept the conclusion that there's a new threat involved. He implied that any leak might have

been designed to buttress arguments for the pending defense budget.

"One cannot fail to remember," Symington said yesterday, "several incomparable spring announcements of previous years—in the early 1950s those thousands of new long-range bombers the Soviets were going to build, but never built; in the late 1950s those hundreds upon

hundreds of long-range missiles the Soviets were going to build but never built."

Secondly, he says he thinks the administration "is playing the game they accuse us of playing." He is chairman of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee investigating U.S. foreign policy commitments. That panel—which often has clashed with the administration—has been accused in the past of leaking classified information supplied by the administration. On those past occasions, however, the issue generally has involved information not regarded as favorable to administration views.

Last month, an administration official, John Lehman Jr. of Henry Kissinger's White House staff, was quoted as telling a group of Senate staffers that Sy-

mington's subcommittee staff had leaked information to the press after secret hearings.

The staff members denied it. No specific leaks were enumerated by Lehman, who refused to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee to document his charge.

Symington is still upset about Lehman's charge. He told a television reporter yesterday, "That so-and-so downtown accusing us of leaking stuff. They're the leaders."

Jackson Referred To Russian Silos, Not New Missiles

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Construction of several new Soviet missile silos but no sign of any new missiles is what Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) was referring to on Sunday when he spoke of Moscow "deploying" an "advanced generation" of such nuclear weapons.

This was learned yesterday as President Nixon held an hour-and-a-half National Security Council meeting on preparations for the fourth round of the strategic arms limitation talks which opens in Vienna next Monday. Final presidential decisions are expected later this week.

Jackson's information was said to have come from a congressional briefing by CIA Director Richard Helms. But the senator's statement was said to have been more specific than the available information, accounting for the cautious wording of Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedman in confirming evidence of "some new ICBM construction."

Most importantly, reconnaissance photos of the new silo construction work were available here before Mr. Nixon's Feb. 25 State of the World report and were taken into account in writing the section on arms control. It was in that report, also, that the President noted, "while it appears that the Soviets have slowed the increase of their missile systems, the evidence is far from unambiguous."

Moscow last winter halted construction work on 18 silos for their giant SS-9 missiles and as of yesterday there was no evidence this work had been resumed. That halt was announced by the Pentagon last Dec. 16. As a result the Soviet SS-9 total stands at 223, though Jackson spoke Sunday of around 305 SS-9s.

American efforts to draw the line on the meaning of that halt have been unavailing. Since the recent discovery of the new silo con-

struction, it is being assumed that Moscow did not want to make much of the SS-9 halt knowing that the United States would discover the new silo work.

Pentagon sources say the new missile construction is different from the normal SS-9 pattern but indicate that the size of the newly observed silos is close to the SS-9 or perhaps slightly larger. Some officials believe that the Soviets may be moving to a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV), rather than a buckshot-style warhead (MRV), for the SS-9, and that this may have changed the shape of the mis-

Jackson interpreted the new work as meaning that "an advanced generation" of ICBMs is being deployed. Others said yesterday that there have been no new missile test firings in the Soviet Union and hence it is unknown just what purpose the new silos will serve. A new generation of missiles, however, is a possibility.

The same situation applies to reports that the Soviets are at work on a six-missile MIRV warhead for the SS-9s. Tests so far have not gone beyond three-missile warheads but theoretically six or several more are possible. The much smaller American Poseidon submarine missile, for example, will have a 10-missile MIRV warhead.

The president said on March 4 that an agreement with the Soviets must include "some mix" of offensive and defensive missiles. That leaves some room for maneuvering at Vienna but unless there is a change of Kremlin instructions the makings of an agreement is not evident.

At the State Department, spokesman Robert J. McCloskey termed the new Soviet silo construction an "important development" which has been taken into account in reevaluation of the U.S. position at SALT.